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This dissertation uses novel econometric methods to correct for biases stemming from imper-
fect information in health care markets. Because of the nature of health and the endogeneity
of treatment choices, modeling the demand for health and outcomes in the health care market
can be difficult, and special econometric approaches are needed to identify causal effects.
The first essay extends empirical models of consumer behavior to allow individuals to
learn across bundled goods, and applies the framework to physician treatment choice. Such
perception spillovers can affect the adoption rate and steady-state market shares of goods,
particularly for market entrants which are strong complements to available products. I
develop and estimate a Bayesian model of learning which allows the quality signal arising
from one particular bundle to be correlated with physician beliefs about the quality of all
other potential bundles in the context of oncology. Using cancer surveillance data with
patient and physician characteristics, I find that physicians do learn across bundles, though
the magnitudes of between-regimen correlations in quality vary substantially.
The second essay investigates how the atypically heaped smoking cessation rate computed
from retrospective survey questions biases coefficient estimates in discrete time hazard mod-
els. If this characteristic of the data is ignored, estimates of the effect of price on smoking
cessation decisions can be attenuated up to sixty-five percent. This paper uses Monte Carlo
simulation to compare an adjusted likelihood approach and several ad hoc approaches to
correct the bias and finds that the adjusted likelihood approach and one of the ad hoc ap-
proaches perform well. The methods are then applied to the Tobacco Use Supplement to
the Current Population Survey and the results are consistent with the simulation analysis.
Returning to the treatment of cancer, the final essay explores how average costs and
outcomes change in the United States as physicians alter chemotherapy treatment patterns
over time. Considering chemotherapy for metastatic colorectal cancer and metastatic non-
small cell lung cancer, and adjuvant therapy for breast cancer, I find that between 2003 and
2006 quality-adjusted life years of survival increased by 11.2 percent on average, but costs
increased by 143.8 percent.
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CHAPTER 1
PERCEPTION SPILLOVERS BETWEEN BUNDLED GOODS: A MODEL
OF PHYSICIAN LEARNING FROM CHEMOTHERAPY CHOICE
1.1 Introduction
When new products are launched, or when consumption does not fully reveal the quality of
an experience good, consumers face uncertainty about the expected utility value of available
products. The natural formation of quality beliefs aids their decision making and provides a
framework for individuals to revise their choices in response to new information. Empirical
models of learning have shown that information gleaned from experience with a particular
good strongly impacts subsequent consumption decisions. A growing literature demonstrates
that physicians in particular, acting as agents for their patients, prescribe a specific treat-
ment using previous patients’ feedback as a source of information about the value of that
therapy.1 When treatments are combinations of two or more drugs, as is increasingly com-
mon in pharmaceutical markets, a physician’s experience with any component drugs can
also influence her beliefs about the quality of a combination regimen, so that information
spills over across treatment options. Such perception spillovers have implications for new
treatment adoption, optimal patient care, and product market share whenever physicians
evaluate products through joint consumption with other goods and use the quality signals
to update their beliefs across all potential bundles.
This research extends empirical models of consumer behavior to allow individuals to learn
1The influence of physician experience has been demonstrated by Coscelli and Shum (2004) and Crawford
and Shum (2005) with anti-ulcer drugs, Narayanan et al. (2005) for prescription antihistamines, Chintagunta
et al. (2009) with Cox-2 inhibitors, Janakiraman et al. (2009) and Dickstein (2011) for antidepressants,
Narayanan and Manchanda (2009) in the treatment of erectile dysfunction, Ching and Ishihara (2010) with
ACE-inhibitors, and Camacho et al. (2011) for asthma and COPD medications.
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about quality across all consumption experiences. Specifically, I develop a dynamic model of
physician beliefs wherein patient feedback from a particular treatment regimen is used by the
physician to update her beliefs about the quality of all potential treatment regimens, not just
the prescribed regimen. Starting with Erdem and Keane (1996) and continuing with recent
research, learning models have examined consumers’ changing beliefs as they incorporate
information from noisy quality signals arising from consuming a particular good.2 That is,
consumers update their beliefs about the true quality of a good from repeated consumption of
the good. Existing models, however, allow beliefs to change only for the particular product
being consumed, regardless of whether the revealed information might alter beliefs about
other products as well. I generalize a model originating with Coscelli and Shum (2004) to
allow feedback from one regimen to inform the perceived value of all regimens, and thereby
capture learning across choice options.
Numerous studies in the empirical literature of economics and marketing have demon-
strated that consumer perceptions respond to market conditions and experiential information
across a variety of settings. Erdem and Keane (1996) originally estimated structural models
of brand choice to explain endogenous purchase behavior by allowing both consumption expe-
rience and advertising to act as sources of information for uncertain brand attributes. Their
model of changing consumer beliefs as Bayesian learning has since been used in diffusion
models of new product adoption (Ackerberg, 2003; Coscelli and Shum, 2004; Chintagunta
et al., 2009), to study the influence of the extent and timing of advertising (Narayanan et al.,
2005; Ching and Ishihara, 2010; Narayanan and Manchanda, 2009), empirical evaluations of
branding (Erdem, 1998; Erdem and Sun, 2002; Janakiraman et al., 2008), and models of
consumers’ behavioral inconsistencies (Lovett, 2008; Camacho et al., 2011).
Absent from this literature is an empirical model allowing for broad perception spillovers
across horizontally differentiated products. Information transfers across goods has been in-
2For an example of recent research, see Osborne (2011).
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vestigated as it relates to branding. Erdem and Sun (2002) expanded Erdem (1998) to
show that both experience and advertising for a particular brand influences consumer beliefs
across products (toothbrushes and toothpaste) of the same brand. The common component,
the brand name, is the channel through which information flows. Janakiraman et al. (2009)
look for evidence of perception spillovers across competing brands by comparing models
of learning in which the quality beliefs of similar and dissimilar products (SSRI and TCA
antidepressants, respectively) are used separately as initial beliefs for new entrants (novel
SSRI drugs).3 They conclude that perception spillovers occur only when products are suf-
ficiently similar without including a channel for spillovers between similar and dissimilar
products simultaneously. In the context of patient-drug matches, patient responsiveness to
one treatment is informative about the effectiveness of other treatments via correlated qual-
ity beliefs, as shown specifically within the learning literature by Crawford and Shum (2005)
and Dickstein (2011). A correctly specified choice model must therefore allow for informa-
tional spillovers between all products concurrently if consumers indeed update beliefs across
multiple alternatives from experience with one.
When goods are consumed jointly, the potential to learn about the value of alternative
choices is significant because of the shared components. A variety of consumer experiences
are characterized by bundled consumption, such as computer hardware and software. This
type of learning is increasingly important to physicians because many new treatments, es-
pecially for cancer, HIV/AIDS, and cholesterol, are combinations of drugs. Since 1991,
several new molecules have been approved by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) for
the chemotherapeutic treatment of colorectal cancer, most as part of combination therapy.
Today nearly all new cases are treated with a multi-drug regimen. The intriguing adop-
tion patterns of early entrants to the colorectal chemotherapy market provide evidence that
3Although Janakiraman et al. (2009) focus on the branding implications of perception spillovers, the
market for antidepressants may instead be suited to an analysis of horizontally differentiated goods.
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physicians have particular beliefs about how information spills over to alternatives. The first
new drug was adopted slowly despite being a strong complement in combination with the
incumbent drug. In contrast, the second entrant, although approved as a stand alone treat-
ment, was adopted primarily as part of a combination regimen with existing chemotherapy
drugs. Broadening the scope of information spillovers can explain some of this behavior.
A physician’s first choice of chemotherapy regimen for the treatment of colorectal cancer
is an ideal setting for a test of perception spillovers. An oncologist’s experience is the
primary source of information about regimen quality because only a fraction of chemotherapy
patients meet the specific conditions for which each of the available drugs was approved, and
because pharmaceutical companies can only market a drug for approved uses. When the
FDA approved new colorectal chemotherapy drugs in 1990 and 1991, the first time since 1962,
physicians faced uncertainty regarding which regimen was best suited for a new patient. As
they learned about the quality distributions of the regimens through use, the market leading
regimen was supplanted by the entrant, a regimen that would eventually hold more than 80
percent of the market share. Another chemotherapy drug introduction in 1996 repeated the
need for learning regarding regimen qualities, particularly since it was primarily adopted in
combination with the other available drugs. The later entrant also faced a greater tradeoff
between efficacy and severity of side effects, which additionally required physicians to learn
about balancing these drug characteristics.
Finding empirical evidence of perception spillovers requires observing repeated choices
by consumers as they encounter new products and learn about their qualities. I hypothesize
that consumers have a joint distribution of quality beliefs for the available products and
update those beliefs in a Bayesian fashion after experience with a particular bundle. If
consumers hold nonzero beliefs about the covariances of quality, feedback from one product
experience will influence the expected quality of every alternative choice option and thereby
exhibit perception spillovers. By allowing those initial covariances to be determined within an
4
econometric model, the existence of perception spillovers, even across differentiated products,
can be tested empirically.
I estimate the model of physician learning using linked cancer surveillance and Medicare
claims data on new colorectal cancer diagnoses. Covering an area representing 26 percent of
the U.S. population, the data include detailed medical information, patient demographics,
and a consistent physician identifier. I construct the complete Medicare patient load of
physicians using that identifier and estimate a learning model with perception spillovers for
their chemotherapy choices between 1991 and 2001. Identification of the model comes from
the changing regimen shares within physician as they treat a sequence of patients over the
decade.
The results confirm that physicians hold joint distributional beliefs about regimen qual-
ities. Physicians update their beliefs for each regimen from all chemotherapy experience, a
conclusion eluding the previous literature. In accordance with intuition from the adoption
rates, regimens entering the market in 1991 were not initially considered by physicians to
be significantly correlated (ρ = 0.011). Although the regimens shared their major compo-
nent drug, the new molecule entered after 28 years without innovation and was not proven
superior in a large study until years after introduction. In this case, perception spillovers
were not a significant source of information for physicians. In contrast, the initial beliefs for
those two regimens with irinotecan, introduced in 1996, exhibited considerable correlation
(ρ = 0.702); physicians updated their beliefs for both regimens from experiences with either.
However, neither of the new regimen qualities was strongly correlated with the incumbent
regimens’ qualities. These results together provide evidence that physicians believed that
any new drug was sufficiently different from the existing drugs during the period that in-
formation spilled over only between regimens sharing the new drug. This type of learning
behavior slows the adoption rate of complementary drugs such as those entering in the years
after the sample.
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To explore the magnitude of these results, I simulate three counterfactual scenarios. First,
to evaluate the importance of spillovers to the dynamics of learning, I simulate regimen shares
when the covariances between the beliefs is set to zero. The counterfactual regimen shares
indicate that learning from experience is primarily informative about the prescribed drug,
but that spillovers to other alternatives do accelerate adoption mildly. The second and
third counterfactuals demonstrate the influence of learning on regimen use. In the second
simulation I force physicians to maintain their initial quality beliefs regarding the regimens
and I find that the adoption of the dominant regimen is delayed by roughly one and a
half years. In contrast, when physician beliefs are set at their ex post levels, estimated as
the final posterior in the model, the third counterfactual shows that learning only partially
mitigates the delayed adoption resulting from quality uncertainty. Together, these results
provide a richer perspective for consumer behavior; namely, physicians form beliefs regarding
how information spills over between bundled goods and use patient feedback to update their
beliefs across treatment options.
This chapter proceeds by first presenting an overview of the chemotherapy market for
colorectal cancer. I then introduce the model in two parts: prescription choice and physician
learning. A description of the data then allows for a discussion of the identification and
estimation of the model. Finally I present the results and discuss simulated counterfactuals
before concluding.
1.2 Chemotherapy for Colorectal Cancer
In 2001, colorectal cancer was third most diagnosed and fatal cancer with an estimated
135,400 new cases and 56,700 deaths in the United States (Greenlee et al., 2001). It has
since become the second most diagnosed and fatal cancer among cancers affecting both
men and women, with diagnosis expected in one of twenty people born today (Centers for
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Disease Control and Prevention, 2011).4 The extent of disease is determined by the tumors’
increasing invasion of local tissue, involvement of lymph nodes, and metastasis, the spread
of cancer cells to other parts of the body. Between 1995 and 2000, the median age at
diagnosis with colorectal cancer was 70 years old and patients had a 63.4 percent chance of
five year survival overall (Ries et al., 2004). The probability a patient survived for five years
ranged from 89.9 percent among those with localized cancers, to 9.6 percent for patients
with metastatic cancer.
The three general methods of cancer treatment are surgical removal, radiation therapy,
and chemotherapy, the total cost for which has more than doubled in the U.S. since 1987,
and exceeded $20 billion in 2009 (Caplan, 2011). The primary treatment for any colorectal
cancer is resection, removing the tumor or sections of the colon with cancer cells, if possible.
Chemotherapy is generally considered adjuvant, or supplementary, to resection before metas-
tasis, but is the standard of care after spread has occurred. The National Comprehensive
Cancer Network (NCCN) maintains treatment guidelines which update the standard of care
with results from new medical research. Most oncology drugs are infused intravenously into
patients within their doctors’ offices. Hospitals and physicians directly purchase the indi-
vidual drugs, storing and administering the drugs to their patients as chosen, creating any
cocktail treatment regimens themselves. For patients 65 and older, Medicare reimburses the
physician for the purchase and administration of intravenous drugs and any oral equivalents
if they exist. Particularly as new drugs later entered the market, physician profits varied
by regimen, altering treatment incentives and leading to Medicare reimbursement reform in
2003.
Chemotherapy for colorectal cancer is primarily dichotomized into the treatment of
metastatic disease and adjuvant therapy for localized cancer. FDA approvals for new
4The change in rank is due to increased screening for colorectal cancer and improved screening and
therapies for prostate and breast cancers.
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chemotherapy drugs, whether the drug is used alone or in combination, indicate for which
type of therapy the approval is issued: metastatic or adjuvant. To the extent a drug’s use
represents a legitimate medical practice, physicians legally may use any FDA-approved (eth-
ical) drug for therapy; however, pharmaceutical firms are only allowed legally to market the
drug for its indicated, “on-label” use. Those firms may later apply for other indications to be
added, such as the other of metastatic or adjuvant treatment, or in a different combination
regimen, by providing supporting clinical evidence of effectiveness for the new indication. All
currently available colorectal chemotherapy regimens were initially approved for metastatic
therapy, despite only 19 percent of new diagnoses being for metastatic cancer and only 25
percent of chemotherapy patients having such extensive disease. Not surprisingly, the Na-
tional Comprehensive Cancer Network (NCCN) estimates that 50 to 75 percent of drugs
and biologics used to treat all cancers are used “off-label,” for conditions not approved by
the Food and Drug Administration (Soares, 2005). These circumstances leave physician ex-
perience as the primary source of information for 75 percent of all colorectal chemotherapy
patients.
The FDA’s first approved molecule for the treatment of metastatic colorectal cancer
was fluorouracil (5FU) in 1962, predating the current era requiring controlled clinical trials
in oncology (Ibrahim, 2003). Before 1962 and well into the 1980s, the nonspecific anti-
cancer drug methotrexate, approved in 1953, was prescribed in some circumstances, but
chemotherapy remained an adolescent practice.5 The use of 5FU was still sporadic through
the 1980s, when oncologists tried using 5FU for adjuvant therapy. Since the drug had passed
patent protection, no clinical trials were performed so that no pharmaceutical firm applied
to the FDA to include adjuvant use as an approved indication.
Levamisole, a veterinary deworming drug, was approved in 1990 for the adjuvant treat-
5As one medical oncologist described early chemotherapy, “When I graduated from residency in 1972
there were five chemotherapy drugs, and you wouldn’t wish any of them on your worst enemy.”
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Table 1.1: FDA Drug Approvals for Colorectal Chemotherapy
Approval Year Drug, In Combination Indication Type of Approval Infusions
1962 Fluorouracil, 5FU Metastatic, Regular 30
First Line
1990 Levamisole Adjuvant Regular 30
1991 Leucovorin, 5FU/LV Metastatic, Regular 30
First Line
1996 Irinotecan, IRI Metastatic, Accelerated 8
Recurrent
2000 IRI+5FU/LV Metastatic, Regular 24
First Line
‘Infusions’ are the expected number of scheduled visits at the outset of treatment to receive therapy.
Sources: Ibrahim (2003); National Comprehensive Cancer Network (2004).
ment of colorectal cancer after two successful studies. On the theory it produced an immune
response to the tumor, the National Institutes of Health (NIH) published a consensus state-
ment recommending it in 1990 as the first new therapy in 28 years (NIH Consensus Con-
ference, 1990). Scientific evidence for levamisole was weak, however, and continued to be
debated in the medical literature. Levamisole never became an orthodox treatment option
and by 1998 it had definitively been shown to produce no benefit while causing unwanted
side effects, prompting its withdrawal from the market.
Concurrent with research on levamisole, leucovorin (LV) was tested with 5FU and shown
to be effective against metastatic cancer, receiving FDA approval in 1991. LV alone is
not chemotherapeutic, but like levamisole, 5FU combined with leucovorin (5FU/LV) failed
to consistently produce benefits in small samples in the early 1990s. However, as larger
clinical trials developed, 5FU/LV demonstrated superior benefits and would comprise nearly
90 percent of colorectal chemotherapy use over the middle of the decade. As an adjuvant
treatment, the regimen quickly became the standard of care and continued to be the NCCN’s
preferred adjuvant treatment into the next decade (National Comprehensive Cancer Network,
2004).
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In 1996 Pfizer won accelerated approval for its molecule irinotecan (IRI) under the brand
name Camptosar, with full approval coming in 1998. The FDA indicated approval for the
drug by itself as second line therapy for metastatic cancer; physicians, however, adopted the
drug more quickly in combination with 5FU/LV for patients with advanced disease. The
first NCCN practice guidelines for colorectal cancer in 1996 did not endorse IRI (National
Comprehensive Cancer Network, 1996), although the combination IRI+5FU/LV was recom-
mended in 2000. The bundled therapy was added as an approved indication in 2000 because
it was demonstrated to extend patients’ lives by an average 3 months despite having more
significant side effects. In addition to effectiveness, the introduction of IRI required physi-
cians learn about the trade-offs between greater toxicity, which promotes efficacy in cancer
treatment, and more severe side effects.
By the end of the decade, there were four main regimens for use in the treatment of
colorectal cancer: 5FU, 5FU/LV, IRI, and IRI+5FU/LV. A very small fraction of patients
received other regimens, typically chemotherapies approved for other types of cancer. In
the analysis, this non-standard treatment regimen forms the outside option available to
physicians. Table 1.1 provides an approval time line, approved indications, and some facts
for each regimen, and Figure 1.1 illustrates the share of prescriptions for each regimen within
the data.
As noted earlier, a significant portion of learning research has focused on physician choice
and pharmaceutical markets because of their impact on individuals and the broader national
accounts. Considering generic prescription drugs cost an average 40 percent less than brand
name products, Ching (2010) simultaneously models aggregate consumer learning and firm
pricing policies to show that slow diffusion of generics can at least be partially explained
by learning. Coscelli and Shum (2004) and Crawford and Shum (2005) use panel data for
the Italian anti-ulcer market to study within-patient and across-diagnosis learning, respec-
tively, showing that each can substantially reduce consumer uncertainty and influence choice
10
Figure 1.1: Regimen Shares for Colorectal Chemotherapy Prescriptions
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probabilities. Other, ongoing research investigates the impact of supply-side behavior stem-
ming from product bundling in the colorectal chemotherapy market with results showing
a less competitive equilibrium resulting from bundling (Lucarelli et al., 2010). Although
firm profits are subject to competitors’ behaviors, their effect on information production and
dissemination to physicians is uncertain.
1.3 Model
My model of physician treatment behavior consists of two parts: chemotherapy choice, and
physician learning. The choice problem follows the standard conditional logit framework
with assumptions reflecting the context of chemotherapy. Physician learning occurs between
choices, so that treatment decisions are made using feedback from all previous patients.
In the model, physicians act as consumer agents for their patients and maximize their
own utilities by optimally choosing among the available regimens to treat their patients. I
assume physicians are myopic, risk-neutral decision-makers, so that in any period, a doctor
chooses the regimen with the highest expected utility given her current information and
without regard to the dispersion of her beliefs. In contrast to a myopic physician, a forward-
looking physician would consider the potential gain to future patients by experimentation
with regimens on the current period’s patients. The risk of malpractice litigation and high
cost of liability insurance are significant deterrents to such behavior. A form of single-patient
experimentation, “N-of-1 trials,” has been established since 1981 but remains extremely rare
(Vohra et al., 2011). Interviews with practicing oncologists confirm that physicians prefer
to prescribe regimens well known through practice, research, or communication with phar-
maceutical companies, and to practice “defensive medicine” to decrease the probability of a
lawsuit (Janakiraman et al., 2008; Kessler and McClellan, 1996). Oncologists, in particular,
face greater than average risk of malpractice suits, though payments are sufficiently rare to
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obscure statistics about the amount (Jena et al., 2011).
Risk-neutrality is an assumption I must make to allow initial quality perceptions to differ
from their final values. In a learning model similar to that described below, Coscelli and Shum
(2004) demonstrate the inability to separately identify a risk aversion parameter from the
initial quality perceptions without additional assumptions. Namely, physicians’ initial prior
means of the quality perceptions must coincide with the “true” qualities across all patients.
In the context of an expanding choice set, however, quality perceptions should change to
reflect the changing relative values of regimens. As a result, no constant “true” quality
ranking exists across patients of different times. Instead I assume risk neutral physicians,
allowing initial and final quality perceptions to differ and quality rankings to change after
new regimen introductions.
Finally, as described above, the set of possible regimens to treat colon cancer has expe-
rienced significant growth. Because the set of available regimens grows over time, define an
“era” as the time span over which the regimen choice set is constant. The introduction of
a new drug will increase the choice set of regimens and thus start a new era. Notationally,
time and eras will pass separately.
1.3.1 Chemotherapy Choice
Let the utility of doctor i treating patient j with drug regimen g ∈ [1, ..., Gp] at time t
(within era p) be given by the following:
U∗ijg = β1Profitgt + β2OnLabeljgt + β3Recommendedjgt + β4NumVisitsg







≡V ∗ijg + ε∗ijg
where
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• Profitgt is the average reimbursement for regimen g at time t less the physician’s acqui-
sition costs of its components,6 OnLabel jgt indicates if the use of regimen g on patient
j falls within the official FDA indication for the regimen at the time of treatment,
Recommended jgt indicates whether the use is recommended by the NIH or NCCN, and
NumVisitsg is the minimum number of office visits a patient would need to make to
receive the regimen.
• Metastaticj indicates if the patient has metastatic cancer, Comorbidity j gives the
Charleson comorbidity weight of patient j derived from his Medicare claims as de-
veloped by Klabunde et al. (2000), and Agej is the patient’s age at treatment.
• δ∗g parameterizes the core quality perception of regimen g. Although completely unob-
served by the econometrician, physicians learn imperfect information about the values
both within and across prescriptions as described below.7
• ξ∗g(t) is a flexible, drug-specific time trend summarizing those aspects of period t which
affect the perception of regimen g but are outside the available data. Namely, ξ∗g(t) cap-
tures learning from medical journals, participation in clinical trials, medical congresses,
and detailing by pharmaceutical companies. The drug-specific trend is constant across
patients and doctors.
• ε∗ijg are independent and identically distributed (across patients, doctors, regimens,
eras, and time) shocks to patient-drug match observed (perfectly) by the doctor but
not the analyst.








6Chemotherapy is traditionally dosed according to the patient’s body surface area since it is believed
to reduce variability in both drug exposure and side effects between patients (Gurney, 1996; Baker et al.,
2002). Since patient height and weight is unknown, this variable has been constructed using a representative
patient based on the mean body surface area and kilograms from patient-level IntrinsiQ data.
7Within the utility model, the core quality perception is constant across patients. While patient response
to particular regimens is indeed variable, the included covariates, taken together, form a particular patient-
drug match value.
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ij0 are consistent with the above.
Because the utility in Equation 1.1 has a stochastic component, a physician chooses that




ijh) for all h ∈ [0, ..., Gp].
Since only differences in utility matter, I normalize the value of the “other” regimen to be
zero without loss of generality. The expected utility for any regimen g ∈ [1, ..., Gp] may
therefore be given as
Et(Uijg) = β1Profitgt + β2OnLabeljgt + β3NCCNjgt + β4NumVisitsg
+ γ1,gMetastaticj + γ2,gComorbidityj + γ3,gAgej + Et(δg) + ξg(t) + εijg (1.3)
≡Vjgt + εijg
where δg = δ
∗
g − δ∗0, ξg(t) = ξ∗g(t)− ξ∗0(t), and εijg = ε∗ijg − ε∗ij0. Letting gij denote the chosen
regimen and assuming εijg is distributed i.i.d. with the type 1 extreme value distribution,
the probability of choosing a specific regimen g is










for any g ∈ [1, ..., Gp]. In the standard conditional logit decision model, the choice probability
is simply the integrand Pijg above. Since physician perceptions δg vary with experience,
however, integration recovers the unconditional probability being modeled.
1.3.2 Physician Learning
The limited information sources available to physicians make experience and learning the
primary driver of the treatment and health of future patients. As discussed earlier, no
approved FDA therapy existed for nearly 75 percent of colorectal chemotherapy patients
over the period. Although the FDA had approved three regimens before 2000 for metastatic
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cancer, clinical trials provide a limited amount of information to physicians for at least the
reason that an individual’s patient load will differ from the trial group. Nevertheless, a
physician begins the era with initial perceptions about each regimen’s quality. In the second
and all subsequent eras, these initial beliefs will be the posterior beliefs from the previous
era. For clarity, let t denote the beginning of the time period.
I assume that at the beginning of time t = 1, doctor i has the following initial beliefs
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Her beliefs consist of average regimen qualities and their variances, as well as covariances
between the regimens. Those covariances capture the extent to which regimens may be
related because of shared component drugs and, like the mean quality beliefs, will be updated
based on the physician’s experiences. The Bayesian learning framework formalizes this.
Each time a physician prescribes a regimen, she receives feedback from the patient’s
experience. That feedback comes in the form of a quality signal. That is, for each patient
receiving regimen g, she observes a signal which she characterizes by
µgt = Etδ
i
g + νgt, (1.6)
with Etδ
i
g coming from her prior and νgt ∼ i.i.d.N(0, ω2) over j, g and t, resulting from
patient idiosyncrasies.
Supposing doctor i begins period t with beliefs on ~δi as her priors and receives signal
8I present the general case for era p = 1; the same structure will hold true for subsequent eras by taking
the posteriors of the previous era, ~δit−1 and Σ
i
δ,t−1, and extending them by the appropriate number of rows
(and columns) for the new regimens available.
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where (i) ~δit and Σδt are the expected mean and variance-covariance matrix of
~δi, conditional
on the previous signals received before t; (ii) ~δiµt and Σµt are the mean and variance-covariance
matrix of the physician’s signals in period t; and (iii) Σδµt is the covariance matrix between
~δi and ~µt which allows for across-regimen learning. Given the form of a signal µgt and the
beliefs ~δit, the elements of the arrays above derive from the following facts:
• E(µgt) = Etδig,
• Var(µgt) = Σδt(g,g) + ω2,
• Cov(µgt, µ′gt) = Σδt(g,g), that is, for two signals on the same regimen,
• Cov(µgt, µg′t) = Σδt(g,g′), for two signals of different regimens, and
• Cov(δig, µg′t) = Cov(Etδig,Etδig′ + νg′t) = Σδt(g,g′)
with Σδt(x,y) giving the (x, y) coordinate of Σδt. Thus Σδµt consists of the elements of Σδt
ordered according to the number of received signals for each regimen in each period.
I model physician learning from experience as Bayesian belief updating by use of the best
linear predictor of ~δit given ~µt. The distribution of quality beliefs conditioned on the signals
received in period t is the posterior distribution for period t. This posterior then becomes
the prior belief distribution for the next period. Following Amemiya (1985), the conditional
distributions are calculated as
~δt+1 ≡ E(~δ|~µt) = Et~δ − ΣδµtΣ−1µt ~δµt + ΣδµtΣ−1µt ~µt
= Et~δ + ΣδµtΣ
−1
µt (~µt − ~δµt) (1.8)
Σδ,t+1 ≡ Var(~δ|~µt) = Σδt − ΣδµtΣ−1µt Σ′δµt.
so that the updating behavior weights the new information by the inverse of the signal’s
variance, just as in ordinary least squares. Physicians use these updated beliefs in their
therapy choice decisions in the following period.
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A standard concern with logit choice models is the restrictive substitution patterns re-
sulting from functional form. The independence from irrelevant alternatives (IIA) exhibited
by the logit model implies proportional substitution across alternatives; the model is mis-
specified if the choices exhibit varying degrees of substitutability because of unobserved
correlation between them. Because the learning model here explicitly accounts for correla-
tions between the choices, proportional substitution must only hold within physician at any
time’s information set. When the physician updates her beliefs and their covariances from a
new feedback signal, the same proportionality need not hold, reducing the restrictiveness of
IIA. The incorporation of learning into the choice model thus additionally provides for more
flexible substitution patterns in applied choice analysis.
In summary, the sequence of events in the models is as follows. The physician begins by
holding initial beliefs about the value of all regimens available. When the first patient needs
treatment, she chooses the regimen with the greatest expected utility, which is a function
of her beliefs, the patient’s characteristics, and national recommendations. After treatment,
she receives a signal of the value of the chosen regimen. Because the quality values across
regimens is correlated, she uses the information from the signal to update her beliefs for
all regimens. When the next patient arrives, she uses these updated beliefs in her decision.
Therefore, from the model, the parameter vector Θ consists of β, γ, and ξ(t) from the choice
problem, the initial mean and variance-covariance matrix of the regimens’ quality perceptions
(E1δ1, ...,E1δG;σ1,1, ..., σG,G), and the signal variance ω
2.
1.4 Data
The Surveillance Epidemiology and End Results (SEER) Program of the National Cancer
Institute (NCI) coordinates the collection of the universe of cancers within several cancer
registries covering 26 percent of the US population. This analysis uses the cases reported
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Table 1.2: Sample Statistics
Mean Std. Dev. Median
Physicians
Patient Load 25.017 17.453 19




Comorbidity Weight 0.422 0.791 0










N = 411 Physicians, 10,283 Patients, 11 Years
in the SEER-13 registries from 1991 to 2001: San Francisco, CA; Connecticut; Detroit,
MI; Hawaii; Iowa; New Mexico; Utah; Atlanta, GA; San Jose, CA; the Arizona Indian
System; Los Angeles, CA; and Rural Georgia.9 In addition to information about the tumor,
SEER collects demographic and socioeconomic information about the patient and, through
a unique patient identifier, follows patients after their diagnosis and surgery. For those in
the Medicare population, the SEER-Medicare linked database provides all Medicare claims
linked with the patient before and after diagnosis. These claims also contain a consistent
physician identifier. Because SEER collects the universe of cancer patients, the physician
identifier enables me to construct each physician’s complete Medicare patient load.
The analysis sample consists of 411 doctors treating 10,283 cases of colorectal cancer
between 1991 and 2001. The sample of physicians was limited to those who treat at least
9Data requests including ZIP code information must be approved by both the NCI and each individual
registry. All registries except Seattle, WA, approved this request.
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10 Medicare patients, aged 65 or older, over the period to select a sample for which learning
could significantly enhance a physician’s treatment patterns. Using drug-specific codes on
physician claims, I deduce the regimen first chosen after diagnosis following Warren et al.
(2002). The regimen specific characteristics come from Thomson Reuters/Medical Economics
Red Book, the FDA’s Drugs@FDA web site,10 the NIH and NCCN practice guidelines, and
individual drug package inserts.
Physicians in the sample had a median Medicare patient load of 19 colorectal cancer cases,
with a mean of 25 cases.11 They used an average of 2.38 regimens in chemotherapy, with the
number of those choosing the “other” regimen roughly equal between physicians who used 2
and those who used 3 regimens. Table 1.3 shows how quickly each regimen was adopted by
physicians. Without controlling for patient arrival, 75 percent of physicians had prescribed
5FU within the first three years, as compared to the nearly 5 years until the same percentage
had used 5FU/LV. Even after 6 years, however, only 35 percent of physicians treated with
IRI+5FU/LV, and less than two percent ever prescribed IRI alone. Given the FDA approval
patterns, such adoption rates imply calculated behavior by individual physicians.
The median age of the patients in the sample is 73 years old, slightly older than the
median of the entire population, and 25 percent have metastatic cancer. Figure 1.2 shows
how patients are distributed over time and by metastatic versus adjuvant therapy. Since
the number of patients is evenly distributed, and the proportion with metastatic disease is
constant, patient composition alone cannot explain the changes in regimen shares over time.
In estimation, age is scaled down so that the Medicare entry age of 65 corresponds to 0,
easing later calculations. Using each patient’s claims for the year preceding the month of
diagnosis, the Charleson comorbidity weight, a measure of potentially confounding factors to
10Available: http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cder/drugsatfda/index.cfm. Approval information
for levamisole and leucovorin were not available on the web site but were obtained through a Freedom
of Information Act request to the FDA.
11Industry publications from the American Society of Clinical Oncology suggest these numbers are repre-
sentative of a typical oncologist’s Medicare patient load for colorectal cancer.
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Figure 1.2: Patients by Year and Extent of Disease
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the treatment of cancer, shows no other major comorbidities for 71 percent of the patients in
the sample. Controlling separately for age and comorbidity is necessary since the elderly are
absolutely less likely to receive chemotherapy than younger patients (Schrag et al., 2001).
Despite the broad coverage of the SEER-Medicare data, the specifics of each program
prevents some information from being available. The SEER data identify cases of colorectal
cancer based on a physician’s location. If a patient is diagnosed or receives therapy outside
of the registry, his data may be incomplete. Additionally, because levamisole was an oral
medication, physicians could not submit reimbursement claims for its use in chemotherapy.12
Thus, the patients receiving the regimen labeled “5FU” may be receiving 5FU alone or
in combination with levamisole. The bias from this measurement error should be small:
leucovorin was an unproven therapy and used infrequently over the period, declining even
more rapidly than 5FU.
1.5 Identification
The estimated parameters from the model fall into two groups: the learning parameters,
consisting of the initial quality perceptions, their variance-covariance matrix, and the signal
variance; and the choice parameters, which apart from the doctor’s expectation of the regi-
men quality at time t, affects the choice probabilities. The choice parameters are identified
from variation in the choice characteristics across patients, regimens, and time as in a stan-
dard conditional logit model. The identification of the learning parameters comes from the
physicians’ choice patterns and signaling mechanism.
Over the sample period, each of the regimens experiences variation across patients and
time. The FDA approvals and NIH and NCCN recommendations are matched by a patient’s
stage and quarter of treatment, so that each doctor faces variation across her patient load as
12The newest data available from the SEER-Medicare linkage does include Medicare Part D claims, made
available after the program’s 2006 expansion to prescription drug coverage.
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Figure 1.3: Number of Regimens Used by Sample Physicians
to the approval and recommendation status of the regimens.13 Further, the NIH recommen-
dations are updated by the NCCN in 1996 and 2000. The number of visits for a regimen,
the metastatic indicator, comorbidity weight, and age variables are all regimen specific to
satisfy the conditional logit requirements of variation across alternatives.
The initial quality values are identified by both the choice model for the initial period of
prescription, as well as by the subsequent pattern of a physician’s prescriptions. In the first
instance of treatment, all physicians share the same initial beliefs on 5FU and 5FU/LV, so
that a conditional logit estimated on that subset of the data would identify those parameters
as regimen-specific constants. In 1996, at the introduction of IRI, the beliefs on 5FU and
5FU/LV would have updated, but again all physicians then share the same beliefs for IRI
and IRI+5FU/LV so that their values act as regimen-specific constants. Beyond these initial
13Of the 411 physicians, 5 do not treat any metastatic cancer patients.
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conditions, however, the learning process itself provides identification. Given a physician’s
prescription choices and any covariance matrix for the beliefs, every value of Et~δg within the
choice model is a function of the initial conditions because of the Bayesian updating process.
Every choice within the data, therefore, provides information on the initial beliefs, albeit
with different, decreasing signal to noise ratios as time progresses.
The variance-covariance matrix of the initial beliefs and the variance of the feedback
signals are determined across physician prescription patterns. Since only the expected value
of the regimen quality enters the choice problem, the variances affect only the degree to
which those means change given the quality signals from a prescription. It is thus necessary
to observe a sufficient number of prescriptions both within and across regimens by the same
doctor to learn about how the updating process occurs. Limiting the sample to only those
physicians who treat at least ten people ensures sufficient information to capture that process.
Figure 1.3 shows the distribution of the number of regimens used by physicians in the sample.
The signal variances are a measure of how responsive physicians are to patient feedback. A
small signal variance will discourage physicians from updating their beliefs since signals are
centered at their perceived mean. As that variance grows larger, physicians will update their
beliefs toward the value of the signal as well as update the regimen’s perceived variance.
Repeatedly noisy signals result in persistently high belief variances over the period.
1.6 Estimation
The data set contains observations on patients, their physicians, and the regimen prescrip-
tion for treating colorectal cancer. If I observed the feedback signal from each treatment
episode I could calculate the revised belief distribution for each physician and substitute
their expectations into each of her treatment choice problems. That signal, however, is
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Table 1.3: Percentage of Physicians Who Prescribe A Regimen for the First
Time in a Particular Year
All Patients
5FU 5FU/LV IRI IRI+5FU/LV Other
1991 44.28 26.03 0.97
1992 21.90 27.01 0.73
1993 9.00 12.17 0.97
1994 5.35 6.08 0.49
1995 4.14 6.33 0.24
1996 4.14 3.89 0.00 2.19 0.49
1997 0.97 4.38 0.00 4.14 0.00
1998 0.73 4.62 0.24 1.22 1.22
1999 0.49 3.41 0.49 4.62 0.97
2000 0.00 1.22 0.24 10.95 2.43
2001 0.24 2.68 0.97 11.44 1.70
Never Rx 8.76 2.19 98.05 65.45 89.78
Metastatic
5FU 5FU/LV IRI IRI+5FU/LV Other
1991 14.29 14.29 0.00
1992 11.58 23.40 0.00
1993 7.14 14.53 0.00
1994 4.68 8.87 0.00
1995 3.45 8.37 0.00
1996 4.19 4.68 0.00 0.74 0.00
1997 4.19 3.94 0.00 2.22 0.00
1998 1.23 5.42 0.25 1.23 0.00
1999 0.74 3.69 0.49 3.94 0.00
2000 0.74 2.71 0.25 7.88 0.00
2001 0.00 1.23 0.99 10.34 0.00
Never Rx 47.78 8.87 98.03 73.65 100.00
Adjuvant
5FU 5FU/LV IRI IRI+5FU/LV Other
1991 43.07 17.76 0.97
1992 21.65 17.03 0.73
1993 9.25 12.41 0.97
1994 5.84 9.00 0.49
1995 3.89 6.08 0.24
1996 3.89 8.52 0.00 2.19 0.49
1997 1.22 9.00 0.00 2.19 0.00
1998 1.22 5.84 0.00 0.00 1.22
1999 0.24 4.14 0.00 0.97 0.97
2000 0.00 3.16 0.00 4.62 2.43
2001 0.24 3.65 0.00 3.65 1.70
Never Rx 9.49 3.41 100.00 86.37 89.78
‘Never Rx’ indicates the group of physicians within the sample who never prescribe the regimen over
the sample period.
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unobserved.14 Nevertheless, since the quality perception of a regimen, conditional on the
covariates, is homogeneous across patients and normally distributed for a given physician, I
can simulate a sequence of physician signals before substituting the quality perception val-
ues into the treatment choice model. Utilizing the Bayesian assumption on updating along
with the physician’s prescription pattern, I use simulated maximum likelihood estimation to
estimate the model parameters as suggested by Train (2009).
Given some initial beliefs on ~δ ∼ N(~δ1,Σδ1), I can forward construct the signals and
updated beliefs as follows. For a given period’s treatment choices, signal vector ~mt has
variance-covariance matrix M made up of parameters from Σδt and ω
2 according to the
equations on page 17. Just as random variables are transformed to match known distribu-
tions, I use ~δt, M , and a vector ~zm, with the appropriate dimension and randomly drawn
from N(0, I), according to
~mt = ~δt + Mˇ~zm (1.9)
where Mˇ is the lower triangular matrix of strictly positive values which results from Cholesky
decomposition of M . With ~δt and ~mt for a period, I use the conditional distribution of the
learning model in Equation 1.8 to create ~δt+1, the period’s posterior and following period’s
prior, and its variance-covariance matrix Σδ,t+1. Starting with the first period and running
through each of the eras, I simulate the beliefs by doctor for all periods. The beliefs are then
matched by period to the treatment choice decision for each patient and a conditional logit
analysis is performed, resulting in an estimated Θˆ conditional on the randomly drawn ~Z.
Any one draw of ~Z and simulation of signals is unlikely to approximate the actual signal
well. To prevent bias from entering through the signal construction, simulating multiple
signal sequences and averaging their outcomes is necessary. Simulating signals R times
14The SEER-Medicare data are rich enough to measure overall survival, progression-free survival, and
potentially even severe adverse events. Incorporating these measures into the value of the signal stands at
the front of future work.
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That is, for any randomly drawn ~Zr, I calculate the sequence of signals and update beliefs for
all physicians before substituting into the logit choice probabilities for each choice. Finally
I average the probabilities across the R draws and then calculate the likelihood as in a
standard conditional logit using the averaged probabilities; they are consistent estimates of
the true probabilities (Train, 2009). For the results in this paper, R = 10 simulations, as in
Coscelli and Shum (2004).
1.7 Results
Tables 1.4 and 1.5 contain the learning and choice parameter estimates, respectively, from
maximum simulated likelihood estimation. The standard errors are derived from finite dif-
ferences estimates of the Hessian at the convergent value of the parameter vector. As a
measure of model fit, Figure 1.4 plots the actual and predicted market shares from the data
and model.
Since the initial perceptions estimates are relative to the outside “other” regimen’s value
of zero, the initial beliefs are estimated on the order we would expect: 5FU was initially
the most popular regimen used and hence has the highest estimate, followed by 5FU/LV.
When IRI is introduced, physicians hesitate to adopt it so that its initial quality value is
large and negative. IRI+5FU/LV offers more promise, however, and thus has a small but
positive value. Each of these parameters is statistically significantly different from zero so
that physicians were clearly differentiating these regimens from the “other” option. Although
the large negative value on IRI holds that the outside option is conditionally preferred to an
FDA approved therapy, this result is only indicative that IRI was not considered a legitimate
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Table 1.4: Learning Parameter Estimates from SMLE
Estimate Std. Errors
Initial Perceptions
5FU 6.8894 * 0.2122
5FU/LV 5.7422 * 0.8929
IRI -56.8409 * 1.0703
IRI+5FU/LV 3.0034 * 0.0400
Initial Covariance Matrix
Var(5FU) 1.7802 * 0.0241
Cov(—, 5FU/LV) 0.1776 * 0.0226
Cov(—, IRI) 0.7773 * 0.0356
Cov(—, IRI+5FU/LV) 0.3197 * 0.0631
Var(5FU/LV) 67.8321 85.1048
Cov(—, IRI) -0.1811 * 0.0161
Cov(—, IRI+5FU/LV) 0.9446 * 0.0231
Var(IRI) 76.0225 * 5.3168
Cov(—, IRI+5FU/LV) 9.1148 * 0.0416
Var(IRI+5FU/LV) 2.2152 * 0.0253
Signal Variance 44.3427 * 0.6587
Simulated Log Likelihood -6488.478
* t > 1.96. R = 10 Simulations. N = 411 Physicians, 10,283 Patients
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Figure 1.4: Actual and Predicted Regimen Shares
treatment option for most patients despite its approval. In particular, estimates from the
choice model show that IRI was considered only a treatment for metastatic cancer on patients
with no comorbidity. Because these characteristics match patients likely to enter a clinical
trial, physicians may be attempting to match clinical trial populations for this regimen
whereas the absence of clinical trial data for IRI+5FU/LV made it more appealing for more
general use.
Turning to the estimates of the initial variance-covariance matrix of the physicians’ be-
liefs, the variance for the 5FU regimen is the smallest; that physicians were relatively certain
of the quality value of the oldest drug on the market is reassuring. As entrants approved
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Table 1.5: Choice Parameter Estimates from
SMLE
Estimate Std. Errors
FDA Approved 0.8016 * 0.0062
Recommended -0.4588 * 0.0008
Number of Visits -0.1305 * 0.0187
Metastatic
5FU -3.1366 * 0.1651
5FU/LV -1.5172 * 0.0245
IRI 60.4247 * 1.5394
IRI+5FU/LV 0.4744 * 0.0066
Comorbidity Weight
5FU 0.1366 * 0.0010
5FU/LV 0.4079 * 0.0327
IRI -25.2968 113.0704
IRI+5FU/LV 0.1990 * 0.0222
Age
5FU 0.0673 * 0.0033
5FU/LV 0.0539 * 0.0054
IRI 0.0064 * 0.0083
IRI+5FU/LV -0.0204 * 0.0009
Time
5FU 0.7521 * 0.0478
5FU/LV 0.4570 * 0.0282
IRI 0.2961 * 0.0690
IRI+5FUL/LV 0.1288 * 0.0525
Time2
5FU -1.2615 * 0.0035
5FUL/LV -0.5488 * 0.0034
Simulated Log Likelihood -6488.478
* t > 1.96. R = 10 Simulations. N = 411 Physicians, 10,283 Patients
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on small samples and short-run endpoints, the beliefs around 5FU/LV and IRI are quite
uncertain, and only the latter are precisely estimated. Leucovorin’s (LV) initial approval
was based on its marginal superiority in a number of small studies when researchers were
desperate to find more effective therapies. The benefits of LV continued to be debated in the
literature until large, widespread clinical trials finished years after its introduction. Similarly,
the large clinical trials for IRI alone concluded after its accelerated approval. In comparison
to the two other new regimens, the initial variance on IRI+5FU/LV is much smaller but also
statistically significant. Why physicians appear to have been so much more confident about
the quality of IRI+5FU/LV at its launch is unclear. Finally, the variance of the signal is
less than that of 5FU and IRI, and its standard deviation in comparison to the size of the
initial quality perceptions is not so large as to prevent inference by physicians on the value
of regimens.
The estimates of the covariances between the initial beliefs of the regimens show to
what extent physicians initially believed the regimens to be correlated, and thus to what
extent information spilled over across alternative regimens. Results indicate that physicians
do hold joint distributional beliefs across bundles in the form of statistically significant
covariances. Although most covariances are small relative the large variances of 5FU/LV and
IRI, they are all statistically significantly different from zero. Between 5FU and 5FU/LV,
the correlation is 0.011, indication an initial perception of only weak similarity. If 5FU
was the standard regimen in 1991 when LV was added under weak medical evidence, then
physicians could reasonably have considered their effectiveness to be related only mildly,
with the new drug providing an uncertain degree of complementarity. 5FU/LV remains only
weakly correlated to IRI and IRI+5FU/LV. The exception to the small magnitudes of the
correlations, however, is that between the regimens containing IRI. The initial covariance
estimates from the model imply an initial belief correlation between IRI and IRI+5FU/LV of
0.702. The strong correlation between IRI and IRI+5FU/LV implies that information from
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the use of either regimen would considerably inform the beliefs of the other simultaneously.
Given the pattern of sizable correlations, physicians seem to believe that any new drug’s
addition to a regimen considerably alters the quality of the regimen, but regimens that share
a new drug are initially perceived to be very similar.
Like the learning parameters, the choice parameter estimates in Table 1.5 reinforce the
anecdotal evidence. Being FDA approved is positively related to the probability a regimen is
chosen, although the model indicates that being recommended by the NIH or NCCN is nega-
tively related to a regimen being chosen. This latter result is not surprising given the current
knowledge of efficacy for these drugs; that is, the early recommendations were incorrect. The
NIH recommended 5FU as adjuvant therapy in its 1990 publication, only mentioning ongo-
ing research into 5FU/LV. When the NCCN updated standard of care recommendations in
1996, it gave the two regimens equal recommendation, not settling on 5FU/LV until 2000. In
several large clinical trials publishing later in the decade, 5FU/LV was been demonstrated to
be superior in every dimension, so that the recommendations stood wrong for over most of
the sample period. IRI+5FU/LV, although later shown to be superior to IRI alone, was not
recommended either. In sum, the “recommendation” variable is signed appropriately. The
remaining covariates suitably show that IRI regimens were favored for metastatic patients
over those with localized diseases, but that IRI alone was intended for otherwise healthy
individuals. Finally, although age has been shown to affect whether or not chemotherapy is
prescribed for any colorectal cancer patient, these results show that age has a small impact
on which regimen is ultimately chosen.
To assess the importance of learning and perception spillovers to physician treatment
practice, I simulate regimen shares over the sample period under three counterfactual sce-
narios. First, to test the empirical importance of perception spillovers, the initial covari-
ances between regimen beliefs are set equal to zero to prevent information from experience
to spill over between regimens in the updating process. Given the small correlations from
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Figure 1.5: Counterfactual Regimen Shares Without Spillovers
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Figure 1.6: Counterfactual Regimen Shares With Maintained Prior Beliefs
the estimates, and as Figure 1.5 shows, the difference between strict product learning and
across-alternative learning is small with respect to how regimen shares shift. Although the
market for colorectal chemotherapy used a variety of single- and multiple-drug regimens
for therapy between 1991 and 2001, physicians’ beliefs about how those drugs were related
reduces the magnitude of the effect of spillovers. Nevertheless, since physicians do hold sta-
tistically significant beliefs about the initial covariances of the quality of regimens, models
of treatment choice, and consumer choice in general, should capture these covariances to
preclude estimation bias from misspecification.
Although the market for colorectal chemotherapy displayed limited use of perception
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Figure 1.7: Counterfactual Regimen Shares With Ex Post Knowledge
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spillovers between 1991 and 2001, the second and third counterfactual simulations confirm
that experience was a significant source of information over the period. As presented in
Figure 1.6, if physicians do not learn from experience, but maintain their initial beliefs over
the entire period, a substantial fraction of patients continue to be prescribed 5FU despite
its inferiority. Because physicians are not learning about 5FU/LV at the same time, IRI
is briefly adopted more quickly than if learning occurs, but later falls below the actual
rate because physicians are so hesitant to move away from 5FU. Although learning from
experience greatly speeds up the adoption rate, it is not a substitute for greater knowledge.
In Figure 1.7, regimen shares are simulated under the assumption that physicians start
the treatment period with the ex post beliefs estimated in the learning model. 5FU and
5FU/LV reach their actual market shares roughly a year before they are predicted in the
learning model. By the end of the data, IRI is also predicted to have a 16 percent greater
market share. These counterfactuals require the assumption that the extensive margin of
chemotherapy would have remained the same under the alternative belief regimes, though
the data suggest the extensive trend does not change over the period.
Using overall survival data from clinical trials and the FDA’s original drug approvals,
I can estimate the survival value of learning within each of these counterfactuals based on
market share. Given the prescribed regimens and their average survival duration in clini-
cal trials, the sample patients survived an estimated 6913.577 years, or 8.068 months per
patient. Disallowing perception spillovers as in the first counterfactual shows that patients
would live 0.045 months less if spillovers were not a source of information to physicians.
The bigger survival difference is a 236.979 year increase learning gives over the second coun-
terfactual of maintained priors, amounting to a 0.277 month, or 3.43 percent, increase in
survival per patient from learning. If instead, physicians had their ex post beliefs at the
beginning, the sample patients would have survived an additional 145.360 years, or 0.170
months, under the third counterfactual. In sum, changes to a physician’s practice pattern
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from learning reduces the cost of uncertainty by 62.0 percent. Learning from experience
therefore enables physicians to overcome their initial uncertainty about a regimen due to
imperfect information, a relatively small portion of which comes from perception spillovers.
Nevertheless, shares would still be greater for the superior regimens if physicians had even
more information available.
1.8 Conclusions
In this paper, I identify a market in which knowledge gleaned from experience with a par-
ticular bundle of goods is informative about the value of other alternative bundles. I esti-
mates a model of learning allowing for these perception spillovers using physicians and their
chemotherapy choices during a period of expanding treatment alternatives. As a particu-
lar example of consumer learning, this work contributes to the understanding of physician
decision-making and consumer information processing. If information flow across alterna-
tives indeed influences subsequent choices, empirical models which ignore this behavior will
be misspecified and suffer from unobserved correlation between choices. Since a restricted
spillover model can be nested within my proposed framework, however, this model may serve
as a starting point for future research.
Employing a data set of the complete Medicare patient load for a set of physicians treating
colorectal cancer between 1991 and 2001, I estimate the model of Bayesian learning and find
physicians do learn across consumption alternatives, evidenced by statistically significant
non-zero covariances within their belief distributions. The results show that physicians are
initially skeptical about the spillovers between incumbent goods and market entrants even
when those goods are used in combination, as seen with the low correlation between 5FU
and 5FU/LV, and 5FU/LV and IRI+5FU/LV. Regimens which shared the new drug IRI
were nevertheless considered highly correlated by physicians, indicating that quality beliefs
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for both regimens were updated when new information for either regimen was received.
Together these results present a picture of how physicians reacted to pharmaceutical
innovation: they considered the addition of a new drug to an established regimen as a com-
pletely distinct therapy, although regimens sharing the a new drug were informative for each
other. After the sample period, the market for colorectal chemotherapy continued to grow
with the approval of two additional drugs over the next three years and two more two years
later, bringing the total number of treatment regimens to 14 by the end of 2006. In contrast
to the regimens introduced in the current sample, one of subsequent entrants, oxaliplatin, is
used exclusively in combination with previously available regimens. Estimation is currently
in progress to include this other type of entrant in the model to further understand the
adoption patterns of physicians.
The importance of learning and perception spillovers are explored in several counterfac-
tual simulations after estimation of the model. From these, results indicate that learning
about the individual product prescribed accounts for most of the changes to regimen shares
over time. Perception spillovers do accelerate adoption slightly in this market, but the dif-
ference between a model which account for learning and one holding prior beliefs constant is
far greater. In fact, comparing this difference to the difference between the learning model
I employ and simulated market shares using physician’s ex post beliefs over the entirety of
the treatment period reveals that learning accelerates regimen share use by more than 60
percent.
Despite the rich dataset used in this analysis, however, not all potential sources of varia-
tion are captured within the model. The sample is limited to chemotherapy after a patient’s
first cancer diagnosis to reduce informational heterogeneity between cases. Physicians may
also learn from recurrent cancer in patients, but how the information available to physicians
in such cases would influence beliefs for initial patient treatment is unclear. An additional
limitation is the absence of information on younger patients with private insurance. Previous
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research has shown that older patients, that is, those on Medicare, are treated differently
on the extensive margin of chemotherapy. If they are treated differently on the intensive
margin as well, the estimates presented here for physician learning on older Americans are
not biased by the exclusion of younger patients as sources of information for physicians.
Finally, a potential source of unobserved information is likely to come from detailing. If
physicians experience differential detailing so that heterogeneity is missed in the time trend
then pharmaceutical advertising remains a concern. Future research could address these
issues and further explain how consumers learn and process information.
Criticisms of the model itself include the lack of complete profit data and reliance on a
time trend to capture relevant changes to universal medical knowledge. Ongoing work will
address these issues by incorporating complete profit data as well as journal article counts
for the Journal of Clinical Oncology, Journal of the American Medical Association, and the
New England Journal of Medicine. As the number of articles using regimens as either the
experimental or control arm of a clinical trial increases, I will assume the increased knowledge
of outcomes will translate into changed probabilities of receiving each regimen.
Two final concerns regard the estimation of the model. First, the estimated standard
errors here are almost surely attenuated, leading to false results of statistical significance.
This attenuation stems from need to simulate the likelihood. A working paper by Lee and
Song presents a modified simulated likelihood which improves inference and future work will
incorporate this method. Second, an implied assumption of the model is that all physicians
begin the treatment of their patients with the same set of beliefs regardless of when they
actually begin practicing. That is, a physician who starts practicing in 1998 is assumed to
have the same initial beliefs as a physician who begins practicing in 1992, despite significant
changes in to the market structure and knowledge base. This concern will be partially
mitigated by the inclusion of medical article counts, but also by the creation of an artificial
physician that sees an average number of randomly selected patients and “learns” over
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time as any actual physician would. The artificial physician’s beliefs are then assigned
to the new physician at the time of her first practice. This procedure will allow for the
differentiation of initial beliefs by time but preserve the inherent uncertainty of beliefs.
With these concerns addressed, this research will contribute an improved empirical method
for estimating consumer behavior and suggest policies that might improve patient welfare
through changes to physician decision-making.
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CHAPTER 2
ERRORS IN RETROSPECTIVE DATA IN SMOKING: COMPARING
MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD AND AD HOC APPROACHES
This research is joint with Donald Kenkel (Cornell University and NBER) and Feng Liu
(Canadian Institute for Health Information), and supported by Award # R01 HD048828
from the National Institutes of Health.
2.1 Introduction
A number of cross-sectional and longitudinal surveys include retrospective questions about
the timing of smoking initiation and cessation.1 These data appear to offer the opportunity
to explore the dynamics of smoking over relatively long time periods. For example, the
current prevalence of U.S. adult smoking reflects smoking initiation and cessation decisions
made over multiple decades and over very wide ranges of cigarette taxes. However, this re-
search opportunity might be partly illusory because of errors in retrospectively reported data
on smoking. On the one hand, contemporaneous self-reports of smoking status are generally
reliable (Patrick et al., 1994), and other studies find substantial agreement between contem-
poraneous and retrospective reports of smoking status (Machlin et al., 1989; Kenkel et al.,
2003). On the other hand, as in other types of retrospectively reported data, retrospective
data on smoking cessation show heaping on round numbers. A smoker is much more likely to
report having quit a round number of years ago (such as 10) than to report an odd number
1Retrospective questions about starting and quitting smoking are included in the cross-sectional U.S.
National Health Interview Survey and the Tobacco Use Supplements to the Current Population Survey.
Retrospective questions about smoking are also included in recent waves of: three of the samples of the
National Longitudinal Surveys Original Cohorts; the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979; the Panel
Study of Income Dynamics; and the Health and Retirement Study. Similar questions are included in the
British Household Panel Survey, the German Socio-economic Panel Survey, the Russian Longitudinal Mon-
itoring Survey, and the China Health and Nutrition Survey.
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Figure 2.1: Cessation Rate Over Time, TUS Survey Year 2002
of years ago (such as 9 or 11).2
Data from the 2002 Tobacco Use Supplement to the Current Population Survey (TUS-
CPS) provide a typical example of heaping in retrospective reports on smoking cessation.
The TUS-CPS includes questions that identify ever smokers, current smokers, and former
smokers. Former smokers are asked: “About how long has it been since you last smoked
cigarettes every day?” We convert these responses to measure the calendar year of reported
cessation. Figure 2.1 shows the implied cessation rate over time. The data show pronounced
2The evidence on the reliability of contemporaneous reports of smoking status comes from studies that
compare self-reports to biochemical markers of smoking (Patrick et al., 1994). Note that it is possible for
retrospective reports of smoking status to be fairly accurate, as Machlin et al. (1989) and Kenkel et al. (2003)
find, even when heaping in the reported date of cessation is common. Consider for example someone who:
smoked for 20 years; is surveyed 11 years after he quit; and in the survey retrospectively heaps his date of
cessation as being 10 years ago. Out of the 30 year period after he started smoking, his smoking status
is correctly classified 97% of the time – his smoking status is only misclassified in the one year he heaped
away from. Whether retrospective data on smoking is accurate enough depends on the research question.
Below we show that heaping at rates comparable to observed data results in substantial bias in the estimated
parameters of a discrete-time hazard model of smoking cessation.
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heaping at 5 and 10 years intervals before the survey year of 2002. For example, the cessation
rate in 1992 — exactly 10 years before the survey — is almost 6%, compared to less than
1.5% in 1991 and 1993. The cessation rate suggests similar heaping in 1987, 1982, 1977, and
so on. In data from the 2003 TUS-CPS (not shown but available upon request), the heaping
is shifted forward one year, with much higher cessation rates in 1993, 1988, 1983, 1978, and
so on.
Because we are interested in modeling the determinants of smoking cessation, the heap-
ing problem is an example of a mismeasured dependent variable. Our study contributes
to a line of applied econometrics research on similar measurement problems in labor and
health economics. In the ordinary least squares context, classical measurement error in the
dependent variable is fairly innocuous; it simply leads to less statistical precision in estima-
tion (Hausman, 2001). In non-linear models, however, mismeasurement of the dependent
variable leads to estimators that are biased and inconsistent. Poterba and Summers (1995)
study misclassification errors in a multinomial logit model of employment status. Hausman,
Abrevaya, and Scott-Morton (1998) consider misclassification error in a probit model of job
change. Kenkel, Lillard, and Mathios (2004) apply the Hausman et al. (1998) approach to a
probit model of smoking participation. Keane and Sauer (2009) incorporate misclassification
error into a dynamic discrete choice model of female labor supply. Turning to non-linear
models with continuous dependent variables, Torelli and Trivellato (1993) and Abrevaya
and Hausman (1999) consider measurement error in data on the duration of unemployment.
Forster and Jones (2001) apply the Torelli and Trivellato (1993) approach to data on the
duration of smoking.
Our key insight is that in a discrete-time hazard model, heaping can be viewed as a special
case of misclassification error. The probabilities of a true 0 being misclassified as a 1, and
vice versa, depend upon whether or not the discrete-time period is a round number of years
before the survey. Hausman et al. (1998) propose an adjusted maximum likelihood estimator
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(MLE) that corrects for misclassification error in a probit model. We tailor their approach
to fit the problem of estimating a discrete-time hazard model with misclassification error
due to heaping. Torelli and Trivellato (1993) and Forster and Jones (2001) consider heaping
in continuous-time duration models. We connect this line of research to the Hausman et al.
(1998) model of misclassification error, moving from a continuous-time duration model to a
discrete-time hazard model (Allison, 1982; Jenkins, 1995). In our application to retrospective
data on smoking cessation, the event of interest seems more naturally modeled in discrete
time.3 Moreover, after the at-risk sample is formed, the discrete-time hazard model only
requires estimating a probit model, which is familiar ground for empirical microeconomists.
We contribute a straight-forward extension of the familiar probit model that allows for
misclassification error due to heaping.
We compare the maximum likelihood approach to several ad hoc approaches with intuitive
appeal. The first ad hoc approach includes an indicator for years in which heaping is likely
as an additional control variable in the discrete-time hazard model. The second ad hoc
approach “coarsens” the data by changing the unit of analysis in the discrete-time model
from a period of one year to five years. The third ad hoc approach “decimates” the data by
eliminating all observations from respondents who report cessation in a heaping year.4
We conduct Monte Carlo simulations to compare the relative performance of the adjusted
MLE to the ad hoc approaches. We simulate data with reported cessation heaped on years
that are divisible by five. We assume that 20% of people who quit smoking in any non-round
year heap their reported quit to the nearest 5-year period. With this degree of heaping, a
na¨ıve probit model that fails to account for heaping yields coefficients that are on average
3As Allison (1984) notes, “when the time units are large - months, years, or decades - it is more appropriate
to use discrete-time methods.”
4The word “decimate” originates from a form of military discipline used in the Roman army, where one
in every ten soldiers in an offending unit would be chosen by lot to be executed, often by bludgeoning. In
our application reported below, using the 2002 TUS-CPS data our version of decimation eliminates about
four of every ten person-year observations.
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biased downwards (towards zero) by 20–65% of the true values used to generate the data.
The adjusted MLE yields coefficients that are on average very close to the true values. Of
the ad hoc methods, the decimation approach yields coefficients that are on average close to
their true values. The decimation approach does less well in recovering the time trend. The
other ad hoc approaches perform poorly across the board.
We also conduct two additional exercises. First, we apply the alternative approaches
to real data on smoking cessation from the 2002 TUS-CPS. Although we no longer have
benchmark true values for the parameters, we note that a na¨ıve probit that fails to account
for heaping yields coefficients on price, schooling, and income that are 20% smaller than the
coefficients from the adjusted MLE. However, other results suggest the actual heaping in the
real data might be more complicated than allowed for in the assumptions of the adjusted
MLE. In our last exercise, we compare the alternative approaches in simulated data with
more complicated heaping patterns than allowed for in the adjusted MLE. The MLE and the
decimation corrections perform well in the presence of uneven heaping. If there is additional
heaping on calendar-decades, these approaches only improve on the bias by roughly half.
2.2 A Maximum Likelihood Approach to Misclassification Error
Due to Heaping
Misclassification Error in a Cross-Sectional Probit Model
We begin by reviewing Hausman, Abrevaya, and Scott-Morton’s (1998) adjusted maximum
likelihood estimator that corrects for misclassification error. Equation (2.1) describes an
empirical demand function for smoking cessation. Let y∗i be the latent variable showing the





iβ + εi (2.1)
The net benefits of smoking cessation y∗i could be formally defined as the difference in lifetime
utility from quitting and the lifetime utility from continuing to smoke (Becker and Murphy,
1988; Suranovic et al., 1999; Jones, 1999). In contrast to equation (2.1), a standard approach
in health economics is to estimate a model of smoking participation, and sometimes a second-
part model of the quantity of cigarettes smoked conditional upon smoking participation
(see Chaloupka and Warner (2000) for a review). As DeCicca, Kenkel, and Mathios (2008)
discuss in more detail, the addictive nature of smoking makes it important to model smoking
initiation and cessation as distinct behaviors.5
The individual quits smoking when the net benefits of quitting are positive, so letting y˜i
be the true response (true smoking cessation)
y˜i =

1, if y∗i > 0
0, otherwise.
(2.2)
Let yi be the observed dependent variable which takes the value of 1 if the individual reports
smoking cessation and 0 otherwise. Let α0 be the probability that a true 0 is misclassified
as a 1,
α0 = Pr(yi = 1|y˜i = 0) (2.3)
and let α1 be the probability that a true 1 is misclassified as a 0,
α1 = Pr(yi = 0|y˜i = 1). (2.4)
5DeCicca et al. (2008) show that a myopic addiction model leads to distinct models of smoking initiation
and cessation. The specification of the standard model of smoking cessation is correct only if smoking is not
addictive: it implicitly imposes the testable restriction that the explanatory variables should have symmetric
effects on initiation and cessation. Not surprisingly, in their empirical analysis DeCicca et al. reject the
hypothesis that smoking is not addictive. DeCicca et al. provide some discussion of how the approach could
be extended to allow for rational addiction or different degrees of addiction. These extensions are beyond
the scope of this paper, but in the conclusion we discuss how future work might usefully explore duration
dependence, which is related to the degree of addiction.
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The expected values of the true smoking cessation, y˜i, and observed smoking cessation,
yi, variables are
E(y˜i|xi) = Pr(y˜i = 1|xi) = F (x′iβ) (2.5)
E(yi|xi) = Pr(yi = 1|xi) = α0 + (1− α0 − α1)F (x′iβ). (2.6)
Typically, we are interested in the partial derivative of equation (2.5) with respect to
a particular independent variable xij; for example, we might be interested in the effect of
a marginal change in the price of cigarettes on the probability of true smoking cessation.
However, comparing the partial derivative of equation (2.5) with the partial derivative of
equation (2.6) shows that with misclassification error, the estimated coefficients of interest
will be biased towards zero:
∂ Pr(y˜i = 1|xi)
∂xij
= f(x′iβ)βj (2.7)
∂ Pr(yi = 1|xi)
∂xij
= (1− α0 − α1)f(x′iβ)βj. (2.8)
Following Hausman et al. (1998), assuming that the distribution function F () is known
(e.g. normal or logistic) we can estimate (α0, α1,β) by maximum likelihood estimation
(MLE), based on the log-likelihood function





yi ln(a0 + (1− a0 − a1)F (x′ib)) (2.9)
+ (1− yi) ln(1− a0 − (1− a0 − a1)F (x′ib))
}
.
In this approach, the misclassification probabilities α0 and α1 are estimable parameters:
significance tests on a0 and a1 provide tests for misclassification error.
Hausman, Abrevaya, and Scott-Morton (1998) point out that identification of the model
parameters stems from the nonlinearity of the F (), so that in the linear probability model the
parameters are not separately identified. They discuss an additional monotonicity condition
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required for identification because for a symmetric F () like the normal or logistic, the MLE es-
timator cannot distinguish between the parameter values (α0, α1,β) and (1−α0, 1−α1,−β).
Imposing the monotonicity assumption that the sum of the misclassification probabilities
must be less than one (α0 + α1 < 1) rules out the second possible set of parameter values.
To shed light on the empirical importance of even modest misclassification, Hausman
et al. (1998) report Monte Carlo simulation results. They consider symmetric misclassifica-
tion probabilities (α0 = α1) of 2%, 5%, and 20%. Even with α0 = α1 = 0.02, ordinary probit
estimates are under-estimated by 15–25%. When misclassification error is more common,
the ordinary probit estimates are underestimated by 62–81%. In contrast, their modified
MLE results based on equation (2.9) yield estimates of α0 and α1 (restricted to be equal)
and β that are very close to the parameters used to generate the simulated data.
Misclassification Error Due to Heaping
We focus on estimating a discrete-time hazard model of smoking cessation. The basic model
of the demand for smoking cessation is of the same form given by equation (2.1). The
dependent variable equals 0 in every year a person smokes and equals 1 in the year a smoker
quits. A person is in the sample every year she is at risk of quitting.
Heaping leads to a specific form of misclassification error in a discrete time hazard model.
We assume that there are two types of years: heaped years (such as 10) where reported
cessation over-states true cessation; and nonheaped years (such as 9 and 11) where reported
cessation under-states true cessation. Using the notation introduced above and subscripting
with “H” and “N” to denote heaped and nonheaped years, respectively, we specifically assume
that in a nonheaped year there is a positive probability that a true 1 is misclassified as a 0:
α1,N > 0. We further assume that there is no probability that a true 0 is misclassified as a
1: α0,N = 0. This is based on the idea that no one mistakenly reports that he or she quit
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smoking an odd number of years ago, for example 9 or 11 years ago. Conversely, for a heaped
year we assume that α1,H = 0 but α0,H > 0. The former assumption is based on the idea
that no one mistakenly misclassifies that he or she quit smoking a heaped number of years
ago, for example, exactly 10 years ago, while the latter is positive to account mathematically
for the misreported quits from nonheaped years. An intuitive example is described in section
2.4.
To augment the likelihood function in equation (2.9) for this setting, let Ti be the number
of periods person i is observed at risk of quitting and n be the total number of individuals.
Further, define
a0,H = a0 × 1 dt is a heaped yearc (2.10)
a1,N = a1 × 1 dt is a nonheaped yearc (2.11)
where 1dc is the indicator function equal to 1 if its argument is true and 0 otherwise. The










yit ln(a0,H + (1− a0,H − a1,N)F (x′itb)) (2.12)
+ (1− yit) ln(1− a0,H − (1− a0,H − a1,N)F (x′itb))
}
with the index function containing any time characteristics needed for modeling the hazard
function.6
Equation (2.12) is a special case of the adjusted MLE approach of Hausman et al. (1998),
tailored to fit the problem of estimating a discrete time hazard model with misclassification
error due to heaping. Where the Hausman et al. model is technically identified through
non-linearities, we exploit exclusion restrictions based on patterns of heaping. In our ap-
6To ensure the maximization routine satisfies the monotonicity assumption in practice, the misclassifica-
tion probabilities are maximized within a logistic framework. That is, for both a0,H and a1,N , the estimated
parameter is λk such that ak =
exp(λk)
1+exp(λ0,H)+exp(λ1,H)
. λk may take any real value while ensuring that both
misclassification probabilities are positive and sum to less than one.
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plication, identification is based on the argument that heaping changes the probabilities of
misclassification error in predictable ways, but should not enter the true hazard rate.
2.3 Ad Hoc Approaches to Misclassification Error Due to Heaping
In addition to the adjusted maximum likelihood approach, we evaluate two ad hoc approaches
previously suggested, as well as a novel ad hoc approach to limit the potential influence of
misclassification. The first previously suggested ad hoc approach creates an indicator for
years in which heaping is more likely and includes the dummy variable as an additional
covariate in the discrete time hazard model. For example, Torelli and Trivellato (1993) and
Forster and Jones (2001) suggest this approach in the context of a continuous-time duration
model. Intuitively, the hope is that by controlling for the increase in the unconditional hazard
for those periods, this approach will reduce any bias resulting from heaping. The hazard
equation that includes an indicator for a heaping year can be thought of as a reduced-form
version of the structural model described by equations (2.1), (2.3), and (2.4). The indicator
for a heaping year serves as an instrumental variable for the misclassification probabilities
given by equations (2.3) and (2.4). Under this interpretation, the ad hoc approach relies on
the hope that it might be possible to approximately recover the parameters of the structural
equation (2.1) directly from the reduced-form. However, in addition to the non-linearity
of the hazard probability, from equation (2.6) the misclassification probabilities enter non-
linearly as well.
The next previously suggested approach “coarsens” the data by changing the unit of
analysis from an annual basis to the period of years around each heaping point. The goal of
this approach is to eliminate the effect of heaping by eliminating heaps and instead focusing
on the cessations over wider intervals, made simple by the discreteness of the hazard function.
A line of statistics research focuses on the data coarsening that results from rounding in
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survey responses (e.g. Heitjan and Rubin, 1990; Manski and Molinari, 2010). In our context,
although heaping results in coarse data on the timing of smoking cessation, we typically have
finer annual data on independent variables such as cigarette prices and income. Our ad hoc
approach is to coarsen the independent variables to match the apparent coarseness of the
dependent variable (smoking cessation).7 Given the data, however, this may be accomplished
in two ways. If the data end at the event, then no further information can be observed and
averaged over the time period around the heaped year. For example, income is unobservable
after an event such as death, so only observations in the years up to the event are averaged.
This procedure will tend to under- or over-state the average of trending variables such as
price. However, in the case more typical of smoking cessation, variables from panel data sets,
such as income, are still observable after quitting, so they may be included in the average
for the period. In our analysis, we refer to the latter case as “complete data, coarsened,”
whereas “heaped data, coarsened” denotes the case where data are unseen after the event.
Our novel ad hoc approach “decimates” the data by eliminating all observations from
respondents who report cessation in a heaped year. Again the hope is to reduce bias at
the cost of information. While this approach distorts the observed rate of smoking ces-
sation, it eliminates all misclassification error due to heaping and so might reduce bias in
the estimated model coefficients.8 Decimation can be viewed as producing an endogenously
stratified sample from the population. The strata corresponding to heaped quit years are
7The coarseness of the typical data on smoking cessation is perhaps not surprising, because a typical
form of the survey question asks “About how long has it been since you last smoked cigarettes every day?”
(emphasis added). To further complicate matters, in typical smoking cessation data it appears that some
respondents round to annual data while others round to half-decades. Manski and Molinari (2010) propose
to use response patterns across different survey questions to infer respondents’ rounding practice. Compared
to more complicated and sophisticated approaches, the ad hoc approach of coarsening discards potentially
useful information.
8To deal with measurement error in reported birth weights, Barreca et al. (2010) propose an approach
similar to what we call decimation. They find that birth weights are disproportionately represented at
multiples of round numbers, especially for children of lower socioeconomic status mothers. Their focus is on
the implications for regression discontinuity (RD) designs where birth weight is the running variable. They
suggest that a straightforward approach to deal with the problem is what they call a “donut RD”: “dropping
observations coinciding with heaps in the running variable (i.e. 100-gram and ounce multiples).”
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missing from that sample though all non-heaped years are perfectly observed. Because the
subset of outcomes corresponding to the heaped years are omitted by decimation, the dis-
tribution of independent variables around heaped years approximates the density of those
variables across all years. This limits the bias introduced by treating the decimated sample
as if it were random when we estimate the hazard model on the remaining sample.9
2.4 Monte Carlo Methods
We conduct a Monte Carlo simulation to assess the impact of misclassification due to heaping,
and to compare the adjusted MLE approach to the ad hoc approaches. The goal of the Monte
Carlo design is to mimic data on smoking cessation that might come from a cross-sectional
survey that asked former smokers: “About how many years ago did you quit smoking?”
We start with a simulated sample of 7,500 smokers of different ages who are in the sample
at-risk of smoking cessation for up to 27 years. We assume each person started smoking, and
thus entered the at-risk sample, in the same calendar year, but at different ages.10 Because
we follow the discrete-time event analysis developed by Allison (1982), a traditional latent
dependent variable model as given by equation (2.1) is constructed for each of the possible
27 periods. An individual “quits” when the latent index first exceeds zero. The individual
remains in the at-risk sample for every period until the quit occurs. We perform 250 Monte
Carlo simulations.11
9The statistical literature has developed estimation techniques to analyze stratified data and Cosslett
(1993) provides a thorough review. The general solutions are (i) supplementing the sample with exogenous
information, and (ii) jointly estimating the marginal probabilities of the outcomes as part of a pseudo-
likelihood. We appeal to one which introduces exogenous information on the distribution of independent
variables and reweights the likelihood to obtain consistent estimates. Using the methods in Cosslett (1993),
one could fully correct the likelihood by replacing the sampling density with its nonparametric maximum
likelihood estimator. The current analysis seeks approaches readily available to applied economists to re-
duce the bias caused by heaping while acknowledging more rigorous, though potentially also more difficult,
solutions exist.
10This is a simplifying assumption to avoid simulating the calendar year of initiation.
11Results will be from the 248 simulations which achieve convergence.
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The two panels of Figure 2.2 show some of the main features of the simulated data on
smoking cessation. Most smoking initiation occurs in the late teens and early 20s, while
smoking cessation is most common in middle age. Although the simulated data are not
calibrated to actual data, they roughly mimic known patterns of smoking initiation and
cessation over the life cycle.
We assume that the latent index that determines smoking cessation is a function of
six covariates, x1 − x6. We use a variety of distributions to simulate the covariates; we
include time-varying and time-invariant variables, and some variables are chosen to mimic
basic determinants of smoking cessation. The first two covariates are time-varying: x1it is
normally distribution with mean 2 and variance 1; x2it is drawn from a uniform distribution
on the interval [0, 5]. The third covariate mimics age: x3it increases by one each period, with
initial distribution 25×β [1.25, 3.5]+16.12 The next two covariates are time-invariant; x4i is
drawn from a lognormal distribution with parameters µ = 1 and σ2 = 1
9
; x5i is an indicator,
like gender, taking on value 1 with probability p = 0.45. The last covariate, x6it, is intended
to mimic the price of cigarettes and stochastically grows over time. x6it is generated in
two steps: in the first step, period 1 prices are distributed uniformly over [2.5, 6], and in
the second step, the price is updated each subsequent period by adding a random amount
distributed uniformly over the interval [−0.1, 0.5]. The error εit is drawn from a standard
normal distribution.
Including a cubic time function, the latent dependent variable is
y∗it = 1.5x1it − 2.0x2it + 0.1x3it − 2.5x4i + 0.3x5i + 0.7x6it (2.13)
− 3.420 + 0.1900t− 0.0123t2 + 0.000384t3 + εit
The coefficients on the time function were chosen so as to have an unconditional hazard
function increasing over time, as we believe the unconditional hazard for smoking cessation
12A floor function is used to ensure ages are whole numbers. The resulting distribution of start ages ranges
from 16 to 40.
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Figure 2.2: Distribution of Simulated Covariates
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does. Here, the selected distribution of unconditional event times is 28B, where B is drawn
from beta distribution β(1.2, 1.8).
The example misclassification rule we use, labeled “random heaping,” posits that indi-
viduals correctly report if their quit occurred in the past two years or any year which is a
multiple of 5, but that 20% of all people who quit in years which are not a multiple of 5
randomly heap to the nearest 5-year period. That is, in the 27 year window, someone who
quits in years 1, 2, 5, 10, 15, 20, or 25 correctly reports the year in which they quit, but
there is a 20% chance that a person who quits, for example, in year 13 will report quitting in
year 15, or that someone quitting in year 12 will report quitting in year 10. In the parlance
of Hausman et al., this is akin to assuming α0 = 0 and α1 = 0.20 in nonheaped years, and
α1 = 0 in heaped years. An example of how this misclassification scheme affects the observed
data can be seen in figure 2.3.
When applying the methods to the data, the “na¨ıve probit,” “MLE correction,” and
“heaping indicator” models use all of the observed periods until the individual reports quit-
ting in accordance with the misclassification rule. As described above, the “decimated sam-
pling” model drops any person reporting quitting in a heaped year. The coarsening models
both average all of an individual’s covariates from the five-year period, the “complete data”
model using all five years since individual observation is possible after quitting, whereas the
“heaped data” model only averages up to the observed quit period in the raw data. In graphs
these are “Full Coarsening” and “Coarsened Seen” respectively.
2.5 Simulation results
Tables 2.1 – 2.4 present the Monte Carlo simulation results for the different approaches
to estimating the discrete-time hazard model with misclassification error due to heaping.
Table 2.1 presents the results for the coefficients on the main covariates of interest x1− x6,
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Figure 2.3: Monte Carlo Simulated Quits Under Random Heaping
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Table 2.1: Monte Carlo Simulation Results, Covariates
Model Coefficient
β1 β2 β3 β4 β5 β6
True Value 1.5 -2.0 0.1 -2.5 0.3 0.7
True Probit 1.4994 -2.0000 0.1000 -2.5013 0.2995 0.7000
(0.0192) (0.0192) (0.0030) (0.0328) (0.0266) (0.0152)
[0.0%] [0.0%] [0.0%] [0.1%] [0.2%] [0.0%]
Na¨ıve Probit 0.5946 -0.6928 0.0495 -1.2466 0.1485 0.3458
(0.0133) (0.0133) (0.0018) (0.0198) (0.0182) (0.0084)
[60.4%] [65.4%] [50.5%] [50.1%] [50.5%] [50.6%]
Heaping Indication 0.6618 -0.7812 0.0532 -1.3412 0.1596 0.3718
(0.0131) (0.0131) (0.0020) (0.0205) (0.0195) (0.0088)
[55.9%] [60.9%] [46.8%] [46.4%] [46.8%] [46.9%]
Decimated Sample 1.5033 -2.0042 0.1006 -2.5213 0.3016 0.7045
(0.0249) (0.0249) (0.0036) (0.0410) (0.031) (0.0178)
[0.2%] [0.2%] [0.6%] [0.9%] [0.5%] [0.6%]
MLE Correction 1.4683 -1.9469 0.1003 -2.5113 0.3005 0.7026
(0.0244) (0.0244) (0.0035) (0.0397) (0.0293) (0.0176)
[2.1%] [2.7%] [0.3%] [0.5%] [0.2%] [0.4%]
Complete Data, 0.8999 -1.0209 0.0444 -1.5323 0.1830 0.3775
Coarsened (0.0204) (0.0204) (0.0026) (0.0252) (0.0259) (0.0122)
[40.0%] [49.0%] [55.6%] [38.7%] [39.0%] [46.1%]
Heaped Data, 0.9738 -1.1076 0.0627 -1.6202 0.1927 0.4549
Coarsened (0.0235) (0.0235) (0.0029) (0.0235) (0.0253) (0.0123)
[35.1%] [44.6%] [37.3%] [35.2%] [35.8%] [35.0%]
See text for descriptions of the methods and Monte Carlo design. Results are from 248
simulations with n = 7, 500. Standard deviations of the simulation results in parentheses;
percent difference from true value in brackets.
57
Table 2.2: Monte Carlo Simulation Results, Time Trend
Model Coefficient
βt βt2 βt3 β0
Truth 0.1900 -0.0123 0.000384 -3.420
True Probit 0.1903 -0.0123 0.000384 -3.4171
(0.0168) (0.0015) (0.00004) (0.1092)
[0.2%] [0.1%] [0.0%] [0.1%]
Na¨ıve Probit 0.1433 -0.0098 0.000272 -2.0550
(0.0102) (0.0010) (0.00002) (0.0659)
[24.6%] [20.6%] [29.2%] [39.9%]
Heaping Indication 0.0602 -0.0034 0.000135 -2.0771
(0.0116) (0.0011) (0.00003) (0.0711)
[68.3%] [72.3%] [64.9%] [39.3%]
Decimated Sample 0.1058 -0.0055 0.000220 -3.1153
(0.0208) (0.0019) (0.00005) (0.1281)
[44.3%] [55.1%] [42.7%] [8.9%]
MLE Correction 0.1717 -0.0109 0.000354 -3.3439
(0.0181) (0.0017) (0.00004) (0.1245)
[9.6%] [11.4%] [7.9%] [2.2%]
See text for descriptions of the methods and Monte Carlo design.
Results are from 248 simulations with n = 7, 500. Standard deviations
of the simulation results in parentheses; percent difference from true
value in brackets. The coarsened methods include period fixed effects
instead of the time trend.








Note: See text for descriptions of the methods and Monte Carlo
design. Results are from 248 simulations with n = 7, 500. The
standard deviations of the simulation results are in parentheses.
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Table 2.4: Monte Carlo Simulation Results, Marginal Effects
Model Marginal Effect
x1 x2 x3 x4 x5 x6
True Probit 0.0619 -0.0826 0.0041 -0.1032 0.0123 0.0289
(0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0001) (0.0011) (0.0010) (0.0005)
Na¨ıve Probit 0.0505 -0.0587 0.0041 -0.1056 0.0126 0.0293
(0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0002) (0.0012) (0.0015) (0.0007)
[18.4%] [29.0%] [0.16%] [2.28%] [2.39%] [1.19%]
Heaping Indication 0.0509 -0.0599 0.0041 -0.1028 0.0123 0.0285
(0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0002) (0.0012) (0.0014) (0.0007)
[17.9%] [27.5%] [0.11%] [0.46%] [0.39%] [1.44%]
Decimated Sample
Estimation 0.0614 -0.0819 0.0041 -0.1027 0.0123 0.0287
Sample (0.0009) (0.0011) (0.0002) (0.0015) (0.0013) (0.0007)
[0.86%] [0.90%] [0.76%] [0.52%] [0.00%] [0.71%]
Full 0.0617 -0.0822 0.0041 -0.1032 0.0124 0.0289
Sample (0.0008) (0.0010) (0.0002) (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0006)
[0.40%] [0.44%] [0.03%] [0.06%] [0.46%] [0.25%]
MLE Correction 0.0604 -0.0800 0.0041 -0.1031 0.0123 0.0289
(0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0001) (0.0013) (0.0012) (0.0176)
[2.51%] [3.16%] [0.29%] [0.16%] [0.12%] [0.23%]
Complete Data, 0.1202 -0.1363 0.0077 -0.1994 0.0241 0.0560
Coarsened (0.0024) (0.0020) (0.0004) (0.0021) (0.0031) (0.0014)
[94.1%] [65.0%] [87.2%] [93.1%] [95.1%] [93.5%]
Heaped Data, 0.1079 -0.1222 0.0053 -0.1832 0.0222 0.0451
Coarsened (0.0021) (0.0018) (0.0003) (0.0022) (0.0031) (0.0014)
[74.3%] [47.8%] [28.8%] [77.4%] [79.9%] [55.8%]
See text for descriptions of the methods and Monte Carlo design. Results are from 248
simulations with n = 7, 500. Standard deviations of the simulation results in parentheses;
percent non-rounded difference from true probit marginal effect in brackets.
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Table 2.2 presents the coefficients on the time trend, Table 2.3 reports additional parameters
estimated in two of the approaches, and Table 2.4 reports average marginal effects for the
covariates x1 − x6. The average marginal effects are computed for each individual in the
sample and the means are presented in the table.
The na¨ıve probit that ignores heaping yields coefficient estimates which are attenuated
by 20–65%, compared to the true values used to create the simulated data. The coefficients
on the main covariates of interest x1 − x6 are attenuated by 50% or more, while the time
trend coefficients are somewhat closer to the true time trend (20–30% bias). The coefficients
on the time-varying variables x1 and x2 are the most attenuated, but even the coefficients on
the time-invariant variables x4 and x5 are attenuated by about 50%. That is, heaping is not
just a problem because it means “the timing is wrong” between the dependent variable and
time-varying covariates. Instead, like misclassification error in a cross-sectional probit model,
it generally leads to biased coefficients. The additional parameters in the MLE approach,
α0,H and α1,N satisfy the monotonicity assumption and are about the magnitude we expect
given the rates of heaping assumed in the simulation. Torelli and Trivellato (1993) find
large biases due to heaping in their simulation results for continuous time duration models.
Hausman et al. (1998) find large biases due to misclassification in their simulation results
for cross-sectional probit models with misclassification. Our simulation results confirm that
misclassification due to heaping leads to potentially serious bias in a discrete-time hazard
model.
Of the approaches to correct for heaping, the adjusted MLE approach and the ad hoc
approach of decimation both appear to work well in the simulations. As in the Hausman
et al. (1998) application to a cross-sectional probit, the adjusted MLE approach to esti-
mating the discrete-time hazard model yields coefficients that are on average very close to
the true parameters on x1 − x6 used to generate the data (0.2–2.7% bias). The adjusted
MLE approach yields somewhat more biased estimates of the time trend (7.9–11.4%). The
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decimation approach also yields coefficients for the covariates x1 − x6 that are very close
to the true values (0.2–0.9% bias). However, the decimation approach yields substantially
biased estimates of the time trend (43–55% bias).
The other ad hoc approaches to deal with heaping – adding a heaping indicator or
coarsening the data – yield substantially biased estimates of the coefficients on the covariates
of interest and of the time trend.13 A weak argument might be made that accounting for
heaping in any way is an improvement over the na¨ıve probit model that ignores heaping.
However, our simulation results suggest that neither of these ad hoc approaches should be
recommended as a solution to heaping.
A more intuitive comparison of these methods may be seen in the densities of the esti-
mated parameters from the simulations. Figure 2.4 graphs the distributions for the estimated
coefficients on the covariates x1− x6. Note that “Full Coarsening” refers the the coarsening
method applied to complete period data, and “Coarsened Seen” refers to that when data
ends at the event. Solid vertical lines indicate the true values used in the simulation. These
figures help illustrate the relative accuracy of the methods as compared to the true value, as
well as the variation of the estimates across simulations from the different approaches.
Because all of the covariates’ coefficients are jointly determined within maximum like-
lihood estimation, differences between the estimated coefficients and true parameters may
be less important than the estimates of the marginal effects, which may also be of greater
concern to policymakers. Table 2.4 and Figure 2.5 present the simulation estimates of the
marginal effects of the primary covariates. In the case of the decimated sample, it is possible
to obtain two sets of marginal effects: one for the decimated sample used in estimation, and
another using the full sample including heapers. The results for both are presented here.
Considering the marginal effects, the structural MLE correction and the decimation re-
sults most closely estimate those marginal effects given from the true probit model. However,
13For the coarsening approach the simulation uses year dummies instead of the time trend variables.
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Figure 2.4: Distributions of Estimated Coefficients for the Covariates in Simulation
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Figure 2.5: Distributions of Estimated Marginal Effects for the Covariates
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the decimated results outperform the MLE correction slightly, with the full sample decima-
tion results being the most accurate. Although those results are close to their respective true
values, the coarsened sample results are strikingly different. Whereas decimation produces
marginal effects all less than one percent different from the true values, coarsening produces
marginal effects no better than thirty percent different. At those levels, its use should surely
be discouraged.
2.6 Real Data
In this section we apply the alternative approaches to real data on smoking cessation from
the February 2002 TUS-CPS. The 2002 TUS-CPS asked all current and former smokers
how long it had been since they last smoked regularly. We use data from 8,055 former
smokers, i.e. respondents with completed spells of smoking.14 Because smoking cessation is
uncommon among young adults, we restrict the sample to former smokers over the age of 30.
Because each former smoker remains in the at-risk sample until he or she quits, the 8,055
former smokers provide an at-risk sample size of 74,153 person-years. The average smoking
cessation rate is about 7%.
The explanatory variables in our discrete time hazard model of smoking cessation include
the real price of cigarettes, age, sex, race, schooling, and income. Cigarette prices and age are
time-varying, while the remaining variables are time-invariant. The real price of cigarettes
is merged to the TUS-CPS data based on the individual’s state of residence in 2002, which
introduces some measurement error in assigned prices due to cross-state movers. Schooling
and income are also measured as of the 2002, and so should be viewed as proxies for the
individual’s level of schooling and income in all previous years.
Table 2.5 presents the results for the different approaches to estimate the discrete time
14Focusing on the completed spells of former smokers makes the real-data sample more similar to our
simulated data, where almost all spells are completed.
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Table 2.5: Results from TUS-CPS Analysis
Na¨ıve Heaping Multiple Decimated MLE Heaped,
Probit Indicator Indicators Sample Correction Coarsened
Price 0.1494 0.1578 0.1156 0.1997 0.1908 -0.0204
(0.0262) (0.0267) (0.0267) (0.0327) (0.0313) (0.0229)
Age 0.0066 0.0064 0.0063 0.0058 0.0057 0.0130
(0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011)
Female -0.0525 -0.0477 -0.0476 -0.0283 -0.0249 -0.0873
(0.0149) (0.0154) (0.0155) (0.0200) (0.0188) (0.0193)
NonWhite -0.0052 -0.0114 -0.0113 -0.0206 -0.0343 0.0187
(0.0238) (0.0246) (0.0247) (0.0323) (0.0302) (0.0304)
Education 0.0135 0.0139 0.0143 0.0202 0.0163 0.0174
(0.0029) (0.0030) (0.0030) (0.0040) (0.0037) (0.0038)
Income 0.0014 0.0015 0.0015 0.0017 0.0017 0.0023
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004)
Year 0.1864 0.2321 0.2670 0.3350 0.2979 0.0338
(0.0206) (0.0213) (0.0214) (0.0329) (0.0314) (0.0014)
Year2 -0.7014 -0.8593 -0.9919 -1.1993 -1.0510
(0.0682) (0.0705) (0.0709) (0.1041) (0.0997)
Year3 0.0900 0.1077 0.1234 0.1421 0.1274
(0.0072) (0.0074) (0.0075) (0.0105) (0.0101)
Constant -4.1689 -4.851 -5.102 -5.8480 -5.7382 -2.5850
(0.2057) (0.2142) (0.2145) (0.3388) (0.3243) (0.0722)










Results are from 2002 TUS-CPS. Standard deviations in parentheses. n = 74153 person-year
observations.
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hazard model of smoking cessation using the 2002 TUS-CPS data. Although we no longer
have benchmark true values for the parameters, we note that a na¨ıve probit that fails to
account for heaping yields coefficients on price, schooling, and income that are 20% smaller
than the coefficients from the adjusted MLE. If the adjusted MLE coefficients are closer
to the true effects, this pattern is consistent with the bias we find in the simulated data.15
Similar to our results, previous applications of the adjusted MLE approach that use real data
to estimate cross-sectional probit models also find that correcting for misclassification error
appears to be important (Hausman et al., 1998; Kenkel et al., 2004). However, in contrast to
our results, Torelli and Trivellato (1993) and Forster and Jones (2001) find that correcting
for heaping in real data does not change much the coefficient estimates in a continuous time
duration model. Torelli and Trivellato caution that this might reflect specification errors of
the duration model.
Unlike both the results with simulated data and the results using real data for price,
schooling and income, for some of the other variables the coefficients from the na¨ıve model
are actually larger than the coefficients from the adjusted MLE model. Intuitively, this raises
the possibility that the heaping in the real data might be more complicated than allowed for
in the assumptions in the adjusted MLE model.
We explore one complication which is motivated by Figure 2.1 above. In Figure 2.1, the
heaping in reported smoking cessation in the 2002 TUS-CPS data does not appear to be
even across all 5-year increments. Instead, people appear to be more likely to heap on the
10-year increments (10, 20, 30, 40, and 50) before the survey than on the 5-year increments
in-between. In addition, there appears to be slight heaping on the calendar-year decades
of 1990, 1980, 1970, 1960, and 1950. To explore this, we extend the probit model with
15Also in accordance with what we find in the simulated data, the decimation approach yields coefficients
that tend to be more similar to those from the adjusted MLE. The other ad hoc approaches yield results
like those from the na¨ıve probit. Coefficients estimated using coarsening were particularly susceptible to the
form of the time trend used. Given the strong correlations between price, age, and time, we use only a linear
time trend in that analysis.
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the indicator for 5-year heaping to include additional heaping indicators for 10-year heaping
and calendar-year decade heaping. Although our simulation results presented above do not
support this approach as a solution for heaping, it should provide a useful diagnostic for the
presence of heaping. The coefficients on the additional heaping indicators are statistically
significant and positive (third column of results in Table 2.5). Based on the argument that
true smoking cessation should not be more likely in the years indicated by the new variables,
these results suggest more complicated heaping in the real data than assumed in the adjusted
MLE model.
2.7 Robustness to Alternative Forms of Heaping
In this section, we return to our simulation exercise to explore how well our proposed ap-
proaches perform when the heaping in the data takes a more complicated form. We explore
the two forms of heaping that appear to be present in the 2002 TUS-CPS data: uneven heap-
ing, with different rates of heaping on 5-year and 10-year increments; and calendar-decade
heaping. We use the same simulated data we used above on true smoking cessation.
We adapt our previous “random heaping” rule over the 27 period Monte Carlo simulation
to incorporate these alternative forms of heaping. Under random heaping, 20% of quitters
heap to the nearest 5-year increment: quitters in year 3-7 round to 5 (or 15 or 25) and quitters
in years 8-12 round to 10 (or 20). Under uneven heaping, 30% of quitters in years 8-12 heap
to 10 while only 15% of quitters in years 3-7 heap to 5. As such, quitters near a 10-year
increment are twice as likely to heap as those near a 5-year increment. Alternatively, when
calendar-decade heaps are introduced, those who heap are evenly split between rounding to
a 5-year increment versus rounding to a nearby calendar-decade year. To illustrate, suppose
a calendar-decade corresponds to the year 7 before the retrospective question was asked.
(This would be the case, for example, for a survey conducted in 1997.) Of the quitters in
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Figure 2.6: Observed Quit Rates Under Alternative Forms of Heaping
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years 3 and 4, 20% round to year 5. Of the quitters in year 6, 10% round to year 5 and 10%
round to the calendar-decade year 7. Where under random heaping we assumed that 20%
of year 7 quitters round to year 5, because year 7 is also a calendar-decade we now assume
that only 10% of quitters in year 7 round to year 5. As under random heaping, quitters in
year 8 are again split between rounding to years 7 and 10. Finally, again as under random
heaping, 20% of quitters in years 9, 11, and 12 round to year 10, because none of those years
is a calendar-decade. Figure 2.6 shows how the observed quit rate under uneven heaping
and calendar-decade heaping differs from the true quit rate and the quit rate observed with
simple (5-year) random heaping, labeled “Seen Quits.”
Figures 2.7 and 2.8 show the distributions of the estimated coefficients on the covariates
from each of the methods when the simulated data are transformed under the uneven and
calendar decade heaping rules.16 To be clear, all of the methods use the earlier assumption
of random heaping; the goal of the exercise is to see how the approaches perform when the
heaping rule is mis-specified. The adjusted MLE approach uses the log-likelihood given by
equation (2.12) that incorporates misclassification error only due to random 5-year heaping.
The ad hoc approach of including a heaping indicator only includes an indicator for 5-year
heaping. The coarsening approach continues to only coarsen around 5-year increments, not
around calendar-decades. Similarly, the decimation approach only decimates observations
from 5-year heapers and retains observations from calendar-decade heapers.
Despite mis-specifying the heaping rule, with uneven heaping the adjusted MLE approach
and the decimation approach continue to perform quite well. Both approaches yield coeffi-
cients on the covariates x1 − x6 that are very close to the true values assumed to generate
the data. The densities of these approaches’ coefficient estimates from the 248 simulations
are very similar to the densities of the coefficient estimates from the probit model estimated
using the true data with no heaping. Correcting for the pattern of misclassification errors –
16Because of their similarity, only the coarsening of the heaped data, rather than the full panel, is graphed.
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Figure 2.7: Distributions of Estimated Coefficients Under Uneven Heaping
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Figure 2.8: Distributions of Estimated Coefficients Under Calendar/Decade Heaping
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with false 1s in years 5, 10, 15 and so on, and false 0s in odd years near the 5-year increments
– appears to be more important than accounting for uneven heaping on 5-year versus 10-
year increments. Above, we suggest an analogy with the method of instrumental variables,
where the indicator for a 5-year increment serves as an instrumental variable for the misclas-
sification probabilities in the structural equation describing observed quitting. Under this
interpretation, the 5-year indicator would remain a valid IV even if there is additional 10-year
heaping, so it is perhaps not surprising that the adjusted MLE approach continues to yield
unbiased coefficient estimates. Further adjusting the MLE approach to incorporate uneven
heaping is straight-forward, but might not be that important in practice. The robustness of
the decimation approach to uneven heaping is easy to understand: whether the heaping is
even or uneven, observations from reported quitters on 5-year and 10-year increments have
been discarded.
With calendar-decade heaping, the adjusted MLE approach and the decimation approach
yield less accurate estimates of the coefficients on the covariates x1− x6. The estimates are
attenuated towards zero, although to a lesser extent than the estimates from the na¨ıve probit
that ignores heaping or the other ad hoc approaches. Essentially, the adjusted MLE and
decimation approaches address bias from the form of heaping they incorporate, but retain
some bias from the calendar-decade heaping they ignore.
2.8 Conclusions
It is well-documented that in retrospective reports of past events, survey responses tend to
be heaped on round numbers of years, such as 5, 10 and so on. For important applications
in health and labor economics, such heaping leads to a specific form of measurement error
in the dependent variable of interest, e.g. smoking cessation or a job transition. This
paper is an applied econometrics exercise to compare alternative approaches to deal with
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heaping. In the context of a discrete-time hazard model of the event in question, we show
that heaping leads to specific patterns of misclassification error in the dependent variable.
Our first approach to deal with heaping uses an adjusted MLE approach based on Hausman
et al. (1998). We conduct Monte Carlo simulations to compare this approach to several ad
hoc approaches to deal with heaping. Our results confirm that ignoring heaping can lead to
substantial bias, and that the adjusted MLE approach recovers the true coefficients used to
generate the simulated data. We also find that one of the ad hoc approaches – eliminating
all observations from respondents who report the event in a heaped year, which we term
decimation – does about as well as the adjusted MLE approach. Both of these approaches
are robust to uneven heaping across 5- and 10-year increments, but perform less well if
there is additional heaping on calendar-decade years. Moving from estimated coefficients to
marginal effects, we see the models exhibit a wide range of differences from the true value.
Overall, the differences are not as striking as those from the estimated coefficients. However,
those variables which are “more random,” as a de-meaned, de-trended price may appear
are those with the greatest deviation. Based on our results, the indicator and coarsening
approaches cannot be recommended as solutions to heaping. However, we note that the
simplest ad hoc approach of adding a dummy indicator variable for heaped years is a useful
diagnostic to detect heaping.
In our simulated data and in real data from the 2002 TUS-CPS, we find that modeling
a time trend while correcting for heaping can be problematic. Because the simulated data
mimic data collected retrospectively from a single cross-section like the 2002 TUS-CPS,
there is an inherent identification problem in both the simulated and real data we use. In
responses from a single year, there is a necessary connection between calendar time - which
drives the trends in true outcomes - and the number of years before the survey - which due
to heaping drives the observed outcomes. In future work we intend to explore the use of
data from repeated cross-sections to model time trends while correcting for heaping. The
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repeated cycles of the TUS-CPS included retrospective questions on smoking cessation asked
in 1992, 1993, 1995, 1996, 1998, 1999, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2006, and 2007. The ability to model
time trends is important for studying the determinants of smoking cessation, because there
have been strong time trends in smoking rates and in many policy variables such as cigarette
taxes. In addition, it might even be possible to explore the impact of more discrete “shocks,”
such as the 1998 Master Settlement Agreement (MSA) – the major legal settlement reached
with the tobacco industry. The public debate and publicity surrounding the MSA might be
expected to prompt higher smoking cessation. The TUS-CPS provide data before, during,
and after the MSA. Important for correcting for heaping, the repeated waves of the TUS-
CPS provide retrospective data collected 1, 2, 4, 5, 8, and 9 years after the MSA. Although
in any one wave the retrospective data on smoking cessation in 1998 will be distorted due
to heaping, careful analysis of the pooled data might uncover the impact of the MSA on
smoking cessation.
Another direction for future work is to extend the discrete time hazard model to allow
for duration dependence. The addictive nature of smoking suggests that the probability of
quitting might fall with the duration of the habit, if longer durations are associated with a
larger stock of addictive capital (Becker and Murphy, 1988). The discrete-time hazard model
can flexibly allow for the probability of quitting to vary with duration, and does not impose
positive or negative duration dependence. While we think that this makes the discrete-time
hazard model an attractive approach to study smoking cessation, it will again be important
to use a method like the adjusted MLE approach or decimation to handle heaping.
Future plans for this line of research include these extensions, as well as other corrections
to the analysis. First, although most simulated covariates were chosen to mimic those in
standard cessation research, with the remaining chosen to capture various types of regressor
distributions, the simulation does not reflect actual data availability. In addition to sim-
ulating these with a joint distribution, the variables will be simulated to ease comparison
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with CPS-TUS results. Second, a greater analysis of marginal effects is necessary to ensure
recommendations for applied economists remain consistent with results from the analysis on
estimated coefficients. The results presented here demonstrate a need to better understand
why some marginal effects differ more than others. With these improvements made, we hope
to provide a full analysis of how heaping in retrospective data may affect estimated results
as well as suggest particular methods to minimize bias in those estimates.
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CHAPTER 3
U.S. CHEMOTHERAPY USE, COST, AND VALUE
3.1 Introduction
The provision and cost of health care have become a central policy issue in the United States,
which spends more than one-sixth of gross domestic product on detecting, diagnosing, treat-
ing, and preventing illness. Beyond spending more per person than any other industrialized
nation on health care, the U.S. also spends more per person on cancer and cancer drugs than
those nations (Jo¨nsson and Wilking, 2007). Nevertheless, in 2011, cancer was the second
leading cause of death, with the American Cancer Society predicting 1,596,670 new cases
of cancer and 571,950 cancer-related deaths that year alone (Murphy et al., 2012; Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention, 2011). Burstein (2012) notes that while cancer treat-
ment guidelines contain “exhaustive references, highly detailed treatment algorithms, [and]
careful delineation of treatment doses,” they do not contain any measure of price. Thus the
question of what the U.S. is getting for its health care spending, particularly surrounding
cancer treatment, remains unanswered.
The costs of health care in the United States proved to be a significant part of recent
health care reform. When the U.S. Congress passed the Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act in March 2010, it created the Patient-Centered Outcomes Research Institute and
the Independent Payment Advisory Board. The federally funded yet independent insti-
tute, PCORI, began development immediately, charged with examining “the relative health
outcomes, clinical effectiveness, and appropriateness of...medical treatments” while the gov-
ernment agency tasked with implementing reforms that “result in a net reduction in total
Medicare program spending,” IPAB, does not begin work until 2014 (PPACA, 2010). The
joint goal of these entities is to reduce overall health care spending while maintaining current
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quality levels.
The primary endpoint and central marker of quality in cancer therapy is overall survival.
Since remission after therapy is not universal, a measure of quality-adjusted survival, which
takes into account tumor shrinkage, the negative side effects of chemotherapy, and likelihood
of eventual recurrence, more accurately reflects the benefits from a particular chemotherapy
regimen. This paper investigates which regimens are used in practice, the average cost of a
patient’s therapy, survival in terms of quality-adjusted life years (QALYs), and the cost per
QALY as they relate to three types of cancer chemotherapy: treatment for metastatic col-
orectal cancer, treatment for metastatic non-small cell lung cancer, and adjuvant treatment
for localized breast cancer.
3.2 Data and Methods
Starting in the 1990s and gaining momentum in the early 2000s, numerous cancer drugs were
released to treat each of the chosen therapy types. Most commonly, these new drugs are used
in predefined combination therapy regimens consisting of multiple component drugs. Among
cancer therapy types, treatment for metastatic colorectal cancer, treatment for metastatic
non-small cell lung cancer, and adjuvant treatment for localized breast cancer were chosen
because of their high degree of consistency to nationally recommended regimens.1 Because
patients may be treated with a number of distinct regimens, the comparison of use, average
cost, expected QALYs of survival, and cost per QALY over time require measures of each
regimen’s market share, average cost per patient, and expected QALYs of survival.
Market share data were constructed using the Survey of Epidemiology and End Results,
an agglomeration of several cancer registries nationwide produced by the National Cancer
Institute, linked to Medicare claims for chemotherapy drug services. This limits the relevant
1The National Comprehensive Cancer Network (NCCN) provides clinical treatment guidelines for these
and a number of other cancers and were the source of the regimen combinations in this study.
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Figure 3.1: Metastatic Colon Cancer Chemotherapy Market Shares, 2002-2006
population to those aged 65 and older in the United States, but the SEER-Medicare data
remains the gold standard of national chemotherapy use. I obtained physician and outpatient
hospital claims for first-time chemotherapy between 2002 and 2006 for colorectal cancer, and
between 2003 and 2006 for breast and non-small cell lung cancer, and identified regimens
based on those claims.
For metastatic colorectal cancer, the relevant drugs are fluorouracil (5Fu), leucovorin
(Lv), irinotecan (Iri), capecitabine (Cap), oxaliplatin (Ox), bevacizumab (Bev), and cetux-
imab (Cet). For metastatic non-small cell lung cancer, the relevant drugs are cisplatin and
carboplatin (Plat), paclitaxel (Pac), vinorelbine (Vin), gemcitabine (Gem), etoposide (Eto),
docetaxel (Doc), and bevacizumab.2 The relevant drugs for the adjuvant treatment of breast
2Over the analysis period, two additional drugs were used to treat NSC lung cancer: gefitinib and erlotinib.
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Figure 3.2: Metastatic NSC Lung Cancer Chemotherapy Market Shares, 2003-2006
cancer are doxorubicin (Dox), cyclophosphamide (Cyc), paclitaxel, trastuzumab (Tras), do-
cetaxel, carboplatin (Car), epirubicin (Epi), fluorouracil, and methotrexate (Meth). In some
combinations, one or more drugs may be optional and these are denoted with a ± sign
in Figures 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3 which give the market share of each regimen as seen in the
SEER-Medicare data.
Average cost of therapy per regimen is calculated using data from IMS Health and NCCN
regimen dosing guidelines. The NCCN specifies treatment length and quantity for typical
patient size, which is then converted to cost using average price per milligram of active
ingredient as reported by IMS Health. These prices should be close to those actually paid
Because these were oral medications without infusion equivalents, they do not appear in Medicare Part A
nor B claims. Nevertheless, these second-line regimens were unlikely to be used on the chosen sample and
thus affect subsequent calculations.
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Figure 3.3: Adjuvant Breast Cancer Chemotherapy Market Shares, 2003-2006
by physicians since IMS Health reports the invoice amount rather than average wholesale
price.
Measures of QALYs of survival are taken from Nicholson et al. (2011), which calculates
the amount of survival time in each of five health states and weights them according to
published QALY weights. Those health states are (1) stable disease without experiencing
a side effect from chemotherapy, (2) tumor is responding to treatment with no side effects,
(3) responding to treatment with side effects, (4) not responding to treatment with a side
effect, and (5) disease progression to a more advanced state. Because survivors of localized
breast cancer live for multiple years, the expected QALYs of survival are discounted at three
percent per year. The amount of time spent in each of those states is estimated from the
FDA-approved package inserts that accompany each drug, journal publications of clinical
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trials referenced by the 2008 NCN Clinical Practice Guidelines in Oncology publications,
and journal articles and conference abstracts identified by searching in PubMed and Google
Scholar for the name of each drug in a regimen with at least one percent market share.
3.3 Results
Although physicians consistently prescribe according to established regimens, some patients
do receive non-established, “other” regimens. Further, some regimens are specifically ap-
proved by the FDA as second-line treatments, to be administered after a patient fails to
adequately improve from first therapy. These therapies tend to be more expensive than
first-line therapies as well as have worse overall outcomes due to the test population. To
accurately describe the changes in cost and outcomes over time, the market shares of reg-
imens are normalized in two ways. Because cost and outcome measures are unavailable
for the “other” regimen, the first normalization drops the portion of patients receiving it
and rescales those other regimens appropriately. In the second normalization, I reapportion
market shares excluding these second-line therapies in the sample from analysis because my
sample consists of first time cancer patients. These measures contrast to those obtained
directly from the data wherein the cost and benefits, in terms of QALYs of survival, of
the “other” regimen are both assumed to be zero. It is included in the following figures to
demonstrate how inclusion of the “other” regimen affects analysis.
3.3.1 Colorectal Cancer
Of the three types of therapy considered here, spending is by far the greatest on metastatic
colorectal cancer. Figure 3.4 details the high levels of spending per patient as well as the
explosive increase. Although there was an upward trend between 2002 and 2004 as physicians
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Figure 3.4: Average Patient CRC Chemotherapy Costs, 2003-2006
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Figure 3.5: Expected QALYs of Survival from CRC Chemotherapy, 2003-2006
increasingly used the new agent oxaliplatin in combinations, the largest increase is due to the
introduction of cancer therapies called monoclonal antibodies, wherein the immune system
is used to inhibit tumors.3 Bevacizumab and cetuximab are very expensive treatments but
provide statistically significant survival benefits.
Across regimens, the expected QALYs of survival are presented in Figure 3.5 and show a
marked increase over time as well. In general, metastatic colorectal cancer patients experi-
ence little over one year of overall survival with considerable side effects from chemotherapy,
so that the adjustment for quality results in a very low QALY survival. Still, over the period
QALY of survival increases by roughly 40%.
Combining the two trends to examine the cost per QALY of survival, Figure 3.6 shows
3Drugs of this type are identifiable by their “-mab” suffix.
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Figure 3.6: Dollars Per QALY of Survival from CRC Chemotherapy, 2003-2006
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that spending per QALY more than tripled over the four years, reaching a high of more
than $50,000. Although the Independent Payment Advisory Board is prohibited from using
cost effectiveness measures, specifically any dollar amount per QALY, to determine Medicare
coverage, what the US is getting from its spending on metastatic colorectal chemotherapy
has dramatically fallen over time.
3.3.2 Non-Small Cell Lung Cancer
Because most chemotherapy regimens for metastatic NSC lung cancer were introduced before
the middle of the 1990s, the market shares show much less variability by 2003 than those
for colorectal cancer. The age of the drugs also corresponds to the much lower level of
overall spending since off-patent molecules are much less expensive than those with patent
protection. Still, Figure 3.7 shows a dramatic increase in spending over 1995. Though it
represents only a small fraction of the market, the bevacizumab-based regimen is far more
costly than other therapy regimens and its use rises during that time period.
The use of bevacizumab to treat lung cancer between 2004 and 2005 is a testament to
physicians’ willingness to provide care to patients. Bevacizumab was first approved to treat
colorectal cancer in February 2002, when it was still in trial to test efficacy for lung cancer.
The data from that trial was released in March 2006 and the FDA granted approval in
October of the same year, but long after physicians began prescribing the treatment as a
first-line therapy to patients. The decline in cost at the end of 2004 may actually be an
artifact of the data rather than decreased usage of the bevacizumab regimen. If physicians
try to gain reimbursement from Medicare for bevacizumab, they may be using a non-specific
drug code rather than that supplied by the Centers for Medicare Studies through the HCPCS
coding system. This would understate the usage of BevPacCar to treat NSC lung cancer
and in turn the average patient cost of chemotherapy.
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Figure 3.7: Average Patient NSCLC Chemotherapy Costs, 2003-2006
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Figure 3.8: Expected QALYs of Survival from NSCLC Chemotherapy, 2003-2006
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Figure 3.9: Dollars Per QALY of Survival from NSCLC Chemotherapy, 2003-2006
Although the drugs approved to treat NSC lung cancer over the period were constant,
Figure 3.8 shows a moderate but continuous increase in expected QALYs of survival over
time. In this figure and the corresponding graph of QALYs of survival for breast cancer
therapy, the unadjusted expected QALYs of survival per patient is significantly different
from that of the adjusted regimens. This difference is the result of a higher proportion
of patients receiving the “other” regimen, stable usage shares of actual regimens, and the
assumed zero QALY survival of “other” in the na¨ıve estimation.
Despite the potential under reporting of BevPacCar in the data, the cost per QALY
of survival for NSC lung cancer also increased over the period. Figure 3.9 shows the 38
% increase in the cost of one QALY of survival from chemotherapy over just three years.
Although the increase is not as large as that for colorectal cancer, the annual growth rate of
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Figure 3.10: Average Patient BRC Chemotherapy Costs, 2003-2006
29.1% far outpaces the growth in overall health care spending.
3.3.3 Breast Cancer
Between 2003 and 2006, the combination of doxorubicin and cyclophosphamide remained the
dominant adjuvant treatment of breast cancer, though overall treatment trended away from
older fluorouracil based regimens toward newer paclitaxel and trastuzumab based regimens.
Historically adjuvant treatment for breast cancer was inexpensive. The confirmation in 2005
that trastuzumab, another monoclonal antibody, was effective at treating localized HER2-
positive cancer, that is, tumors over-expressing an influential hormone gene, dramatically
increased the average cost of care since trastuzumab-based regimens were more than three
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Figure 3.11: Expected QALYs of Survival from BRC Chemotherapy, 2003-2006
times as expensive as the non-trastuzumab-based regimens. Thus, despite trastuzumab’s
small share of the market, Figure 3.10 clearly depicts its inclusion in therapy regimens as
having a dramatic increase in the cost of care.
Since adjuvant chemotherapy is used for smaller, localized tumors, survival from breast
cancer chemotherapy is much longer than for either of colon or lung cancer. Figure 3.11
bears out this difference and shows that QALYs of survival from chemotherapy regimens
steadily increased between 2003 and 2006. That steady increase stands in sharp contrast to
the abrupt increase in overall cost of adjuvant chemotherapy. Figure 3.12 shows that the
cost per QALY of survival jumped with the increased use of expensive therapies in 2005.
Like the cost of one QALY of survival from colorectal cancer, the three year increase here
equates to a roughly 200% increase in the cost of each QALY.
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Figure 3.12: Dollars Per QALY of Survival from BRC Chemotherapy, 2003-2006
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3.4 Discussion and Conclusions
Unsurprisingly, the cost of chemotherapy, like health care spending overall, increased between
2002 and 2006. In the cases presented here, the increase ranges from 38% for metastatic
NSC lung cancer, to over 300% for metastatic colorectal cancer. Though that cost increase
has been met with increases in quality-adjusted survival, the growth rate for the latter is
dwarfed by the former, so that the cost per QALY has increased significantly across each
scenario. Shifts in the market composition toward newer, more expensive though marginally
more efficacious regimens prompted these changes, with the rise of monoclonal antibody
therapies being a primary example of that shift.
Although this study sets out to study the changes in average benefits from chemotherapy
use, the question directly posed to payers is the value derived from any new particular ther-
apy. Incremental cost effectiveness ratios (ICERs) are widely used, wherein a new regimen’s
cost is compared to a consistent reference drugs cost and the difference is scaled by their dif-
ference in quality adjusted life years saved or lost. This ratio is the basis for recommendation
by the United Kingdom’s National Health Service’s National Institute for Health and Clini-
cal Excellence (NICE). Although the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act expressly
prohibited the used of such measures, NICE, for example, has recommended against the use
of bevacizumab and cetuximab for the treatment of metastatic colorectal cancer on the basis
of its cost and incremental effectiveness (National Institute for Health and Clinical Excel-
lence, 2007). Identifying consistent reference treatments and employing ICERs throughout
would enable an analysis such as this to be more in line with a policymaker or private payer’s
question. Nevertheless, identifying and quantifying at even a broad level as here can make
clear how spending per patient translates into outcomes across time.
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